On Definitions In General

[clehrich]

Given the recent threads on Monopoly the RPG and other related topics, it seems as though the old definitions problem has raised its ugly head once again.  Having been trained in a discipline (History of Religions) in which this problem is perennial, I'd like to add a few theoretical points about definitions themselves, in hopes that this will give some grounds for future debate.  In particular, I hope to help avoid the "talking past each other" problem, which seems endemic to this sort of discussion.

I'm not going to apply this to RPGs concretely, but use them a bit for examples.  My hope is that from here, there might be (1) some discussion of definitions problems where I'm unclear or there is disagreement, and (2) some discussion of application to the RPG problem, probably in another thread.

On Definitions
When debate begins to move into the definition problem, it usually results from a growing recognition that the interlocutors are not discussing the same thing.  That is, participants make assertions which cannot both be accurate, and refer them (initially implicitly) back to definitions.  This then demonstrates that the definitions do not accord, and in order to evaluate the force of the initial statements, it seems as though discussion must agree on "first principles," i.e. definitions.

We see this with RPG discussions in the Monopoly example: in order to argue whether Monopoly does or does not have anything to do with RPGs, we refer discussion down to definitions, such that we end up discussing roles, rules, shared worlds, and other base issues.  Each of these requires further definition questions, but debate about them will again be referred to underlying definitions or categories, and so forth.

For this reason, definitions discussions tend to produce the constant charge, "This is degenerating into semantics."  In general, this statement is code for, "You are shifting the discussion into words, where I am talking about things, so there is no basis for future discussion."  At this point the moderators tend to get itchy.

So what have we learned thus far?

[*]Definition questions arise from and are intended to solve dysfunction
[*]Discussion tends to produce sub-terms or categories, each requiring separate definition
[*]Absolute disagreements about categorical definitions commonly become discussions of words
[*]Arguments about words tend to be seen as sterile, because divorced from things[/list:u]
Words and Things
If we want to discuss things, we require a shared conception of truth and perception.  As has been demonstrated time and again, in philosophy, logic, and mathematics, pure (metaphysical) truth is not accessible within any reasoning system; only relative truth has a rigorous foundation.  Thus if a definitions debate reaches the point of debating truth-content per se, it is not resolvable.

At the same time, there is rarely adequate agreement about shared truth, and this is particularly the case when (1) the participants are not all formally trained in logic and epistemology, and (2) the object under analysis is non-tangible (as is the case with RPGs).  Thus there is really no point in debating the pure truth-content of various propositions: no agreement is likely, and debate will very rapidly become sterile.

The result is that we can only debate words; there are no things to discuss.

So how do we avoid empty discourse, if all we have is words?

Them's Fighting Words
We require several important considerations when debating words; rather than formulate them in logical succession, I shall present them sequentially, with explanations as I go.

Arbitrariness: Words do not refer to things; they refer to other words, to discourse.  If we cannot discuss things, as noted above, we cannot pretend to discuss them by claiming that our words refer to them.  They do not, as Plato already noticed and as has been accepted (with numerous complications) ever since.  So when we discuss words, we are discussing constellations of other words around them, not objects.(1)

Fixed Definition: We can define words propositionally, as axioms for discussion.  That is, we can say, "Given that term XXX has the following properties or meanings," and from this argue about something else.  We see this in algebra, for example.  If x=5, then we can discuss what y means in terms of x; what we cannot do is debate what x means.  The "given that" statement of fixed definition removes that term from debate.

Category: A common variant of the Fixed Definition is the categorical definition: "Given that Category X includes the following elements...."  Again, this is no longer debatable once the statement has been made.  The usual followup is to discern whether some other element does or does not belong in the category thus defined, which involves discerning the logic of inclusion and exclusion for the category as defined.

Comparison: When we define a category, or in fact a word at all, we necessarily formulate a comparison.  By saying, "Sorcerer and TROS are RPGs," we set up the following comparison:

Sorcerer and TROS are similar with respect to the category RPG[/list:u]The questions immediately arising, of course, are:

[*]What similarity or similarities do they have that places them into the category RPG?
[*]Are all their similarities necessary to the category RPG?
[*]Are there other aspects to the category RPG?[/list:u]Etymology: This common trope of definition is a fallacy.  It is the practice of arguing, "Because X term really means Y (according to a dictionary, linguistic history, etc.), therefore...."  But no word really means anything: words are arbitrary, and hence debatable unless defined in a fixed sense, which removes them from ordinary language by shifting them into a specific and limited form of discourse.

Purpose
An essential upshot of all these points is this: definition as a form of discourse and debate must serve some theoretical end.  There is no point in trying to work out, for example, what an RPG really is, because this becomes a debate about what real thing this categorical term refers to, which as an effort is filled with logical fallacies.  Instead, the purpose of the debate must be to define the term in the service of some other debate.

There are really two ways to deal with this within a bounded discourse like the Forge.

1. Terms can be defined in a fixed sense, and used as terms of art in further discussion.  Debate may then rage about the implications of this definition, but the definition itself is not directly accessible to discourse.  A convenient example is GNS, which refers – by arbitrary fixed definition – to a set of three terms, each also arbitrarily defined as fixed.

2. Terms can be debated in service of a broader theoretical end, i.e. in order to formulate acceptable fixed definitions serving as grounds for discussion.  This is what goes on in the GNS forum: the discussion may include, within that bounded discourse, debate about the adequacy of formulation of the fixed definitions of GNS, or about the possibility of total reformulation of such definitions.  In both cases, the purpose is the refinement of the GNS model to make it as effective an analytical tool as possible.

In the former sort of discussion, one cannot debate GNS itself; those terms are set as grounds for discussion.  In the latter, one can debate GNS, but one cannot do so by referring it to "real things," since Narrativism (for example) does not exist except as a category of discourse.

A third possibility is worth considering, but requires considerable care and precision if it is not to slip into logical incoherence.  One can debate the implications of terms (e.g. GNS), by reference to exterior putative objects (e.g. particular games), and find that the analysis discerns some underlying supposition on the part of the model itself.  This can then be analyzed and critiqued, leading in turn to some reformulation of the model.  In particular, one may seek underneath such categories some metaphysical principle, such as a claim of truth in object-references (i.e. this term is valid because it really does refer absolutely to the following object).(2)  But only rarely is this form of discourse helpful directly, and again it must serve some further analytical end in order to have value.

Conclusions
The essential point I'd like to emphasize here is that debates about definitions have to have an analytical purpose outside themselves.  There is no point in debating what RPG's really are: they really are whatever we choose to make them.  The question is how to define the category RPG such that it is useful for discussing something else, such as analyzing problems and structures in actual RPG play, design, or theory.  The same goes for GNS: the only point in debating Ron's various definitions is if you think theory would be better served, for some specific reason, by a reformulation of the definitions.  This point was well made, I thought, by the argument that "playing roles" per se cannot be an adequate definition of RPG if we are to exclude Monopoly and Chess; the underlying point was that in order for the category "RPG" to be useful for analyzing the things we usually talk about, it has to have grounds for excluding Monopoly and Chess.

I have tried to avoid a lot of jargon and technicality in this, but if I have not been successful, please say so.  My point is to allow future discussions of definitions to move forward coherently, without a lot of "round and round" about whether it's all really semantics or whatever.


Notes
1. Please note that "arbitrary," in technical philosophical and linguistic discourse, does not mean random.  Words are arbitrary in the sense that there is no absolute reason that the English word "cat" refers to animals like my pet snoozing in the sun.  There are certainly historical reasons for it, but there is nothing built into the sign that makes it mean this.  This is part of why words can't get you to truth: they only refer to other words, making the system of language a system closed to Ideality.

2. Incidentally, this is a very small part of what is called "deconstruction" within philosophy.  For what it's worth, I'd like to point out that this term does not in its own discursive sphere mean criticism, analysis, reductionism, or breaking things down.  Take a look at Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, which explains (and performs) deconstruction.

[Ian Charvill]

To jump into the mire...

Arbitrariness: Words do not refer to things; they refer to other words, to discourse.  If we cannot discuss things, as noted above, we cannot pretend to discuss them by claiming that our words refer to them.  They do not, as Plato already noticed and as has been accepted (with numerous complications) ever since.  So when we discuss words, we are discussing constellations of other words around them, not objects.

There is a logical sense in which this cannot be true.  There must at some point have been a first word, which could not have referred to other words but only to a thing.  In fact, sophisticated as we are, the majority of our ordinary use of language refers to things.  if I stand by the road and yell "taxi" I don't expect someone to throw me a banana.

The fact that one cannot prove philospically that language refers to objective categories of things, doesn't invalidate it.  Absence of evidence is not evidence of absense.  Before there was a proof of gravity, people still fell to their deaths.

Historically, "role playing game" has been used as a label without rigour - hence it means different things to different people.  This does not seem to me to be a necessary truth stemming from the nature of language, just a historical fact steming from the way things happened to go down.

[clehrich]

Ian,

You're misunderstanding slightly.  Here's a quick-and-dirty version of C.S. Peirce's formulation:

Sign -- Interpretant -- Referent

Sign: a word, for example; something that is understood to "mean" something.

Interpretant: an intelligent being who believes he or she understands the system in question.

Referent: an actual thing or object.

The interpretant encounters the sign, and imagines it pointing to the referent.  Thus when you say "Taxi," the taxi-driver interprets this to mean that you want him to pull up next to you.

It's not that words don't refer to things; it's that they don't do so naturally, but by human convention.  We all agree that "cat" means the animal, but Mandarin speakers don't agree on this; they all agree that "mao" means the animal.  Nobody is more right or wrong about this: we're referring to a set of conventions within our culture, not to actual objects.

To shift things slightly, we might note that "cat" is actually categorical: it might mean Fluffy to you, but mean Tiger to me.  The hope is that there's enough common ground that we can talk to each other intelligently despite this.

Does that help?  I'm not saying that words have no meaning; I'm saying that words mean something within a system of discourse, not within nature as exterior to discourse.

Historically, "role playing game" has been used as a label without rigour - hence it means different things to different people. This does not seem to me to be a necessary truth stemming from the nature of language, just a historical fact steming from the way things happened to go down.

The nature of language is indeed such that the term means different things to different people; that's the way it is with all signs.  The question is whether for purposes of a deliberately limited discourse, such as the Forge, you gain anything by formulating a fixed definition.

[Adam Dray]

Coincidentally (or perhaps not) this is analagous to a design pattern used in computer science: Model-View-Controller, developed for Smalltalk around the same D&D was being written.

The model is the object that represents the domain, or some part of it.
The view is a representation of the model in the user interface.
The controller manipulates the model and changes the view according to user input.

I would map them:
   Sign -- View
   Interpretant -- Controller
   Referent -- Model

[clehrich]

Adam,

I don't know enough about computers to comment intelligently.  Here's a fairly stock version; you tell me if it fits:

Suppose you don't know a language at all, although you know the alphabet.  You have a dictionary from the culture in question.  Okay, so you look up a word.  Now what you get, as a "definition," is a bunch more words.  Okay, so you go look up all of those, and they're defined with a bunch more words, which you go look up, and so on.  Eventually you come full circle: you've looked up all the words, and if you're exceedingly intelligent and have a phenomenal memory you can see how every word relates to every other, but you've never gotten outside the book.  So you can define any word in terms of other words, but you can't ever define them in terms of things.

So here:
Sign = word
Interpretant = knowledge-less dictionary-user
Referent = more words

If the dictionary-user already knows the conventions of the language, i.e. if you look something up in an English dictionary:
Sign = word
Interpretant = knowledgeable dictionary-user
Referent = things

So what allows you to get from words to things is you, not the words.  (Really, this example shifts to signifier/signified, but that's not terribly relevant here.)

So does that fit?

[Ian Charvill]

Does that help?  I'm not saying that words have no meaning; I'm saying that words mean something within a system of discourse, not within nature as exterior to discourse.

So you're including within the idea of discourse such things as memories, mental images, patterns of behaviour?  When I say 'cat' I'm referring to an idea in my head of what a cat is; when I call for a 'taxi', I'm referring to a behaviour (for want of a better term) of a vehicle pulling up and taking me somewhere.

If you're using discourse to include them, then I concede the point.

Historically, "role playing game" has been used as a label without rigour - hence it means different things to different people. This does not seem to me to be a necessary truth stemming from the nature of language, just a historical fact steming from the way things happened to go down.

The nature of language is indeed such that the term means different things to different people; that's the way it is with all signs.  The question is whether for purposes of a deliberately limited discourse, such as the Forge, you gain anything by formulating a fixed definition.

W/r/t terms like Narrativist? Yes.  Within the GNS framework they are, in a sense, proprietary terms of Ron's.  With regards to 'role playing game'? No, emphatically not.

I don't think it's ever going to be useful to tell someone when they first come here that they have to read a glossary definition of "role playing game" before they can have a conversation with us.  It would play into some of the worst stereotypes that people have of The Forge.  The term wasn't originated here, it would be counterproductive to try and lock it down here.

[clehrich]

When I say 'cat' I'm referring to an idea in my head of what a cat is; when I call for a 'taxi', I'm referring to a behaviour (for want of a better term) of a vehicle pulling up and taking me somewhere.

Right, so when you say "cat" that's a sign.  Both the idea in your head and the actual animal are referents.  You, and anyone you're talking to, agree to connect that sign "cat" to both the animal and the idea.

I don't think it's ever going to be useful to tell someone when they first come here that they have to read a glossary definition of "role playing game" before they can have a conversation with us.  It would play into some of the worst stereotypes that people have of The Forge.  The term wasn't originated here, it would be counterproductive to try and lock it down here.

Yes, my point exactly.  Thank you.

[Nick the Nevermet]

good post.
But if you ever start to deconstruct roleplaying definitions to find the underlying power relations, you'll make me cranky. ;-)

But you're right that we need to keep a specific idea on what definitions & theory are supposed to do.  Over here in sociology, we spent most of the 20th Century trying to create an exact theory of social life that perfectly explained everything in real, concrete terms.

For some reason, it didn't work.  Go figure.  Now most theorists in soc are content to make localized, particular, analytical theories that help organize reality, but don't pretend to be explanatory models.  I think that is how RPG theory should work to, and I think in general that is how people here discuss it IMO.  With that said, its good to get explicit reminders every once in a while.

[clehrich]

But if you ever start to deconstruct roleplaying definitions to find the underlying power relations, you'll make me cranky. ;-)

But surely it's obvious that underlying such definitions is the proposition: Ron is God?  :p

But you're right that we need to keep a specific idea on what definitions & theory are supposed to do.  Over here in sociology, we spent most of the 20th Century trying to create an exact theory of social life that perfectly explained everything in real, concrete terms....Now most theorists in soc are content to make localized, particular, analytical theories that help organize reality, but don't pretend to be explanatory models.

Thanks for that nice, clear example -- I have a tendency to slide into abstractions that aren't helpful to everyone.

I think that is how RPG theory should work too, and I think in general that is how people here discuss it IMO.  With that said, its good to get explicit reminders every once in a while.

I don't entirely agree that this is how most discussions have been running, but that's a side issue.  As you indicate, I was just trying to be explicit about this stuff so discussions can remain fruitful for analytic purposes.

Thanks for the vote of confidence!