"Realism" valued in both G and S?

[Wormwood]

This is an idea that stems from technical play analysis I've been doing. The common assumptions I've encountered indicate that the desire for the game to match real world features comes from a sub-type of simulationism. However I suggest that this is only partly true. In addition there is a strong subtype of gamism which has a vested interest in real world adherence. In particular,  players who wants their game strategies to be more applicable than just the game. In other words, validating their ability to overcome not only game challenges but also real ones, via the implication of realism.

I'm curious to see what others think on this particular point, and whether this suggestion has any critical flaws, especially viewing it as a test of the technical play perspective of GNS.

For clarification, the technical play analysis that leads to this conclusion starts with the recognition that as a learning activity, simulationist play involves learning declarative knowledge, but the push for realism is the desire to learn more useful or more widely accepted declarative knowledge (in the sense knowing how to speak Russian is (potentially) more useful than speaking Klingon).  However this same exact drive could also be applied to the acquistion of procedural knowledge (Gamism), and the desire to learn skills that are more appropriate to real life application. While this is a lesser drive, since even abstract strategy can have real world applications, such a bias should exist in some reasonable portion of the cases.

I look forward to hearing any suggestions or critiques, thank you for your time,

  -Mendel S.

[Ron Edwards]

Hello,

My current thinking is that "realism" represents a commitment to a specific set of constraints on Exploration.

If that Exploration is the priority of play, we're talking about Simulationist play, or more accurately, one sort of Simulationist play.

If that Exploration serves as the basis or plausibility-constraint for Gamist or Narrativist purposes, then we're talking about Gamist or Narrativist play, respectively.

"Realism" per se is therefore a feature of whatever sort of play, in GNS-terms, you are after.

Associating "realism" with Simulationism is mistaking the degree of commitment (e.g. "realism before all else") to a thing with the thing itself.

Best,
Ron

[Wormwood]

Ron,

First, I never claimed that realism is a subtype of simulationism, I claimed that realism is valued strongly by a subtype of simulationism. Likewise with a subtype of gamism (and also of narrativism, which I realized shortly after my previous post). In each case the valuation stresses distinct elements of real world adherence: simulationism recieves the most benefit from a detail adherence, ideally adjusting game dynamics to re-adhere details when inconsistencies occur; gamism recieves the most benefit from adherence in challenge resolution (in the broadest sense), and narrativism recieves the most benefit from cultural and psychological adherence. Each of these is easily described as realism, but at the same time are naturally distinct, since each portion links strongly to the learned material of it's related agenda.

Second, it should not be unreasonable to consider classes of constraints as being given a non-trivial priority, without the need to delineate precise levels of "commitment". This holds with realism, as well as other elements which can be added to the game. After all, some constraints must exist, if they didn't it would cease being a game.

Thank you for your time,

 -Mendel S.

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Mendel,

It'd help if you didn't read my post as a disagreement.

You wrote,

I claimed that realism is valued strongly by a subtype of simulationism. Likewise with a subtype of gamism (and also of narrativism, which I realized shortly after my previous post).

Which agrees with my post, which agreed with your post. My points, like yours, take issue with:

The common assumptions I've encountered indicate that the desire for the game to match real world features comes from a sub-type of simulationism.

We apparently agree that these common assumptions are mistaken. So I don't see an issue.

Regarding constraints,

it should not be unreasonable to consider classes of constraints as being given a non-trivial priority, without the need to delineate precise levels of "commitment".

Again, agreed in full. I go even further to say that constraints are central, much more important than "non-trivial."

So we're agreeing. Do you see that?

Best,
Ron