Creative Agendas, Aesthetic Purism, and 'the' Social Mode

[Doyce]

Ian, you and I are using very different definitions of the word "narrative." The definition I'm using concerns a fictional series of events which include at least one identifiable protagonist engaged in an identifiable conflict, and the events resolve that conflict. [snip] Your "description of series of events" doesn't qualify.

Umm.

Here's the problem, as I see it:

1. Ron defines narrative as above.
2. "The World" (by which I mean 'people who didn't learn English on the Forge or in lit-crit classes') defines narrative as "A narrated account; a story." and defines story as "An account or recital of an event or a series of events."

That's it.  Good old Merriam-Websters does not in any way require a protagonist in conflict.*

This is not, as Eric J-D would have it, "understanding the term 'narrative' in a very restrictive sense." The above common definition is very broad -- it is by adding further qualifiers to the definition that it becomes "restrictive" or (more telling) "exclusive".

I respect Ron's definitions.  More to the point, I respect that those ideas need to be expressed as concise terms.

I cannot, however, believe that we (even Ron :) gets to redefine the dare-I-say universally-held definitions of incredibly common words.  We don't have that kind of influence, and we don't have that right.  If we want to engage the average gamer in useful conversation, we need to use step away from lit-theory use of the language.

I don't care how well I play basketball, or write about basketball -- I don't get to correct someone trying to learn about the game by pointing at a very specific brand of basketball and saying "These are the only things that qualify as basketballs to me.  Please don't refer to those other brands as 'basketballs', they aren't."

(*Lit-theory usually does make sure requirements, but about as many people read lit-crit as have ever read the Forge game-theory.  There may be a connection there. :)

[Jason Lee]

I wanted to get to this thread sooner, but time has been slim and work has been plenty.

*****

I think Sim is screwing things up a little again.

The Discovery agenda I mentioned in the second thread is not the same the agenda discussed in the essay Simulationism: The Right to Dream.  Though they are both being called Sim, Exploration squared/internal causality and understanding/knowledge are different priorities.

I think you're totally right that a social or therapeutic agenda is not Exploration squared.  I'm still up in the air on whether or not it is Discovery, a different agenda, or two different agendas.  I'm waiting to see what becomes of Emily's dating game.

*****

The problem with the Nar definition is not just you - it was my problem with the definition.  The new essay makes decent steps to fix this, but I think it's still a little too narrow.  The essay pulls from one author's point of view on play writing.  Novel writing is different, short story writing is different, ballad writing is different, and different authors have different takes on theme (Premise).

I quoted Jerome Stern in The roots of Sim II which might help a little with the Nar definition thing.

Stories have themes, themes make stories, and that's really all there is too it.  I went to see Troy last night (liked it btw, but was kind of let down that I wasn't sad at the end) and they had the Spiderman 2 preview on before it.  That preview is nothing but theme.  At one point the announcer guy says, "One man will challenge his destiny" or something else equally silly sounding.  That little phrase is the theme, or part of it anyway.  The Spiderman advertising folks expect that to interest you, and it probably does, because it's a theme and it'll make a story.

Now I'm just babbling.

I think you have something different than Nar with a social agenda.  Because the social agenda isn't a motivation to create a story.  Behaviors created by different agendas often appear the same - something I've recently noticed is more common than not.  The underlying agenda, the motivation behind the player's decisions, will ultimately make the final product quite different even if individual moments seem like they could be any agenda.

I'm still where I was before on the issue of a social agenda - open minded, seeing it in play, but not seeing it as a primary motivation in any of the players I know.  I feel the same about Discovery.  The fact that I think I've seen traces of it gives it credibility for me, but I just don't have enough data to make a decision.

[Ian Charvill]

I just reread the thread start to finish and I seem to have helped take it off at something of a tangent.  It might be worth starting a subthread if people think there's much mileage at all in the drama/narrative/story thing but I can't think of much else to add on that issue.

Just to help bring it back to Sean's original concerns, I think the best way to establish a fourth mode would be with an actual game (maybe Emily's) or detailed actual play examples.  I think if people could generate one or both of those it would aid theorising tremendously.

And Crucial (Jason isn't it, but I'm bad with names), I'd agree strongly that the Spiderman II trailer (and indeed the first film) foregrounds the subtextual issues the story (i.e. theme) to play to two markets: voiceover gets the adults visuals get the kids kind of thing.  The visuals are saying it's about a guy who can climb walls and shoot web and this nifty keen supervillain with like mechanical tentacles and the voice over is saying it's about real world issues.

[Eric J-D]

Doyce,

I fear you've misunderstood me, and I think that is largely my fault because when I wrote my most recent post it was 4:00 AM.  Here's what I meant to say: it isn't that the definition of narrative as "an account of a sequence of events" is restrictive.  Obviously it is about as broad a definition as one can get, encompassing as it does recognizably literary stories, non-literary ones, reports, diary entries, travelogue and so forth.  What I meant to say (and I should have known better than to be up at 4 am writing) is that it was overly restrictive to reduce the meaning of narrative to a single entry in a dictionary.  The OED recognizes several definitions of narrative in its second edition, one of which refers clearly to fictional narratives like those under discussion.  So it seems unduly restrictive to say that narrative means only "an account of a sequence of events" when the most authoritative dictionary in the English language recognizes that this is one among many meanings of the term.  Same goes for story.

That's all I was trying to say.  I'd go further and say that I don't think most people out in the world understand "narrative" and "story" in anything like the ways you described.  Do people really think that when they open a novel or watch a film unfold that they are merely observing a sequence of events, sans theme, sans premise, sans conflict?  As I was trying to point out in the example of my 9 year old's response to the film "Whale Rider," you don't even need exposure to the most elementary literary concepts to know that story means more than simply a sequence of events unfolding in time.

Sure, there are plenty of writers who argue that their stories are devoid of theme and might appear to take the position that they are really nothing more than accounts of events.  Twain has a famous line about this in one of his works; but often this is nothing more than a false front.

So, I guess I disagree that the term is as misleading to people as some are suggesting.   I also think that even if this understanding of narrative weren't contained in any dictionary, it would be perfectly legitimate for Ron to define and use it in this way in his essay.  After all, this is common practice in theory.  Derrida is a perfect example of this.  He routinely uses the words "writing" and "trace" in his early works in ways that are quite different from their commonplace meanings.  Of course, he goes to great lengths to try to explain the way he is using these terms, so it is not a legitimate objection to say that he can't use them in these specialized ways because that is not how the terms are commonly understood.

I think we probably agree that the Forge ought to limit the amount of specialized language it creates and uses so as not to utterly intimidate newcomers, but isn't part of the agreed upon social contract of the Forge that there are some terms that have specialized meanings and that it behooves newcomers who wish to participate in certain fora (like RPG Theory and GNS Model Discussion) to try to acquaint themselves with it.

[Aside: as I was typing this it occurred to me that a term like Thematism might be a bit closer to what Narrativism is all about, but it somehow strikes me as too reductive and tendentious]

Anyway, all this is pretty far from the original topic of the thread.  So let's get back to Sean's questions.

Eric

[Erling Rognli]

Irene Tanke and I recently wrote an article for the swedish larpzine Fea Livia concerning meaning and messages in larps. It will also appear in the june issue of The Larper. Admittedly, it is not rooted in Creative Agenda theory and it concerns larp, specifically of the scandinavian political type. Yet, I feel there are a few points in it which might be found relevant to this discussion.

One of our central points is that meaning is communicated from the play experience to the individual participant when the participant makes a retrospective interpretation of events in the shared imaginary space (diegetic events in scandinavian larplingo). As we see it, meaning does not exist before it is found through interpretation by the individual participants. The gamemaster (or larpwright) can attempt to control the flow of events (Illusionism and use of Force, if I understand the terms right) to get a spesific story told. However, to define the meaning of the play experience, in effect giving it a message, the individual interpretations must also be controlled. Those individual interpretations are made within the context of three different perspectives on the diegetic events; as a character within the fiction, as a player in that particular process of roleplaying (participant in the social contract), and within their greater personal frame of reference. The percieved meaning is, along with the experience of the social contract at work, what the player brings with her into the rest of her life. It is therefore these two things that might spark changes in a players life.

Now, as I see it, the adressing of premise in narrativism might also be understood as making in-game choices with the consideration of what is expected to yield meaning in retrospect. (Meaning here understood as percieved intellectual or emotional relevance.) This means that those choices are also made within the personal frame of reference of the player. Therefore, both in the choices of actions and in the retrospective interpretation of those actions and their consequences, issues that are relevant to the player will surface, affecting both choice and interpretation. If not done on purpose, this will very often happen subconciously. In effect, narrativism that works out will always yield meaning of some kind, it will always be relevant to you, and it will therefore affect your outlook and the rest of your life. This does of course not mean that all groups with narrativist creative agendas are really therapy groups. The issues that surface might be more or less pressing and dramatic, depending on the players level of personal development. They might primarily be of intellectual relevance, rather than emotional.

Now, I think this shows us that the possibility for personal development is inherent in narrativism. The interesting question is if it is inherent in all roleplaying. After all, any roleplaying will create some kind of sequence of events that might be interpreted as a story. Any story might be seen as meaningful, and affect some kind of change, on some level, in a player. Issues that are pressing might bleed into the players in-game choices subconciously, independent on mode of play, although narrativism is the only mode that actively supports and encourages it. However, as I said earlier, meaning is not the only thing brought over into the rest of a players life. The experience of the social contract at work also has the potential to affect a players life.

As a conclusion I think I rather agree with Eero, that there is no social agenda that exists alongside the three creative agendas. Rather, I think that desire for affecting social change is an alternative source motivation for the different creative agendas, an alternative to wanting to have fun of some kind, either in the G, the N, or the S flavor.


Erling

[contracycle]

It has to be said there is something sueful to be had from using the extremely broad/vague use of the term 'story' for certain RPG applications, but beyond that would like to propose we begin referring to "formal story" to indicate that we are referring to story as it is understood in rough academic terms.

[Emily Care]

Hi Erling,

Welcome to the Forge! Thank you very much for posting a synopsis of your article.  This is a sophisticated analysis of the creation of meaning role play. I'm glad to have these words to help think about these topics.

One of our central points is that meaning is communicated from the play experience to the individual participant when the participant makes a retrospective interpretation of events in the shared imaginary space (diegetic events in scandinavian larplingo). As we see it, meaning does not exist before it is found through interpretation by the individual participants.

So meaning for the individual gets constructed at the moment of interpretation by that individual.  Even when play is "front-loaded" with meaning or premise (as in a scenario created by a gm or in written game materials), what gets communicated to the individual is only what they are willing or able to take from it.  You mention that the article was written about political larps, is this an answer to attempts to circumscribe meaning generated in such games?

Eero and Erling, you may (or may not) have more experience both of didactic oriented games and ones that may fit the "psychological examination" profile (ie where the focus is specifically on the personal development or internal experience of the player than many of us reading here. If you do, do you have any specific examples you may speak of?  Or anyone else, of course.  

In your experiences with either of these types of games, have participants in them recognizably engaged in one of the three known creative agendas? Are there differences/similarities with standard entertainment oriented gaming that stand out to you? For example, what might the relationship be between didactic games and railroading, or with traditional games where the gm presents the challenge or premise to be addressed?

yrs,
Emily

[clehrich]

Like Ian, I'd like to step away from arguments about what is and is not narrative, story, plot, fiction, and whatnot, and get back to Sean's issues with respect to a social mode.  It seems that Sean has now decided that the social cannot itself be a CA, and while I agree with him it's not, I think, for the same reasons.  My feeling is that what Sean is probing at is something that cannot really be handled intelligently within the Big Model, because of the formal, hierarchical relationship between Social Contract and Creative Agenda.

Sean started with an excellent point about SIS, one that I think hasn't been taken up strongly enough:

[T]he model treats the shared imaginative space, as an integral whole, created by game play as the vehicle for fulfilling those desires. ... That is, focus on story, on the dream, or on challenge are all understood as aiming for certain things within the shared imaginary space of the game. It is actions in that imaginary space which fulfill the different CA of the different players.

To put it a bit differently, the definition of CA, which as Eero points out is entirely about in-game decisions, requires that the classification, structuring, and evaluation of a game focuses solely on the SIS.  That which is outside, be it social or otherwise, is understood to be not central to gameplay and therefore cannot be constitutive of CA.

At its extreme limits, this approach to art is a kind of aesthetic purism: efface from the art object all signs of its relations to the world outside it, so that its integrity as a self-sustaining reality can be upheld.

Note that the "art object" here is the SIS!

However, it seems to me entirely reasonable that one could have a shared imaginary space as a tool to accomplish things quite outside it.

The trick is, as I think Sean has now realized, these objectives and effects have no place in the Big Model, because the Big Model takes as axiomatic that only effects upon and within the SIS are relevant.

I think you too may be guilty of aesthetic purism. If the social mode is understood as a mere motivation to play, where the play itself is understood as creating a shared imaginary space in some way, then yeah, sure, it's not a CA. I grant that, and on that picture one would say that this sort of thing 'is handled at the social contract level', or even at the personal level prior to establishing a social contract.

This is exactly how the Big Model works: the social end of things is a motivational, prior issue; play itself is then constructive or creative; and the SIS is the product.  This is consistent with Ron's later points about making cups and pots: "ultimately, there is only one way actually to make pots - (a) not to have one to start and (b) to carry out acts which reliably get pots.  That's Narrativism."  Any effects of work within the SIS upon the social situation are tangential, not part of the theory.

[T]he social mode (not a CA, but a particular focus on the Exploration to bring it towards real-world stuff) is a really important and interesting part of gaming that deserves more exploration. We make friends out of gaming: how do we do that?

I would rephrase this question: since the SIS can affect the world outside itself, how does it do so?  Isn't there a dynamic and continuous relationship between SIS and the social dimension?  Why is this unidirectional?

I'm still where I was before on the issue of a social agenda - open minded, seeing it in play, but not seeing it as a primary motivation in any of the players I know.

First, "social agenda" is not the same as a social dimension to play.  Second, "primary motivation" here assumes that the social dimension can only be a motivating factor.  I don't mean to single Jason out—he just happens to have put it particularly effectively.

One final quote, and then I'll try to bring things around:

I see everything in Chris Lehrich's discussion of "ritual" as "shrug, reward system."

Ron correctly suspects that I'm going to bring up ritual again.  Unfortunately, what this remark clarifies is that he and I are almost totally failing to communicate.  I cannot see how the social delineation of a set of spaces, times, and actions as special constitutes a reward system.

– – –
Okay, so where does all this lead?

The social dimension at stake here is not solely a question of motivation.  Social relations are affected by play, unquestionably.  We make or lose friends while gaming, to take a simple example.  The thing is, the Big Model sees this stuff as incidental, because it is exterior to the SIS: if the characters make friends, that's relevant, and if the players have their characters make friends because of their own outside social relations, that is also relevant.  But if there doesn't seem to be a direct correlation between events in the SIS and whatever social effects happen among players, there is no way to take seriously those effects.

The problem, as I see it, is that the Big Model is hierarchically structured.  Everything heads toward SIS, i.e. gameplay.  Factors outside SIS may affect play, but the SIS does not usually affect the exterior factors.  As Sean says, this has something to do with a kind of aesthetic purism: it's a theory that postulates its artistic object as standing on its own.

Now this really depends upon a more interesting and subtler problem within the Big Model.  As we know, the SIS is taken as an object, a discrete "thing".  Ron uses the metaphor of a cup or a pot.  Sean has used the art object metaphor.  And so forth.

But step back from it for a minute.  First of all, the SIS itself is non-demonstrable.  How do we know it's shared, for example?  And if it isn't, then we just have a bunch of folks sitting around yapping.  In fact, we don't know it's shared—what we do know is that the bunch of folks accept the notion that it's shared, and furthermore do so largely without question.  Again, how do we determine what is and isn't part of the SIS?  I mean, while it's happening, right now?  Why isn't the fact that Phil has a nasty cold and keeps blowing his nose part of the SIS?

Oh, well, because of the Social Contract, right?  Nonsense.  Or rather, it's true, but meaningless.  It makes the social dimension of play into a dumping-ground for all this supportive background, and asserts that if everything is going well, the social remains essentially invisible.

I maintain, on the contrary, that what's most interesting is going on at the social level.

1. How do we determine what is and is not part of the SIS, at the time of play?
2. How do we deal with tension and contest about this issue?
3. If social relations change significantly in the course of play, either in a single session or among several sessions, how is it decided whether and to what degree this is relevant to SIS?
4. Why is it that there is significant resistance to the notion that social relations, particularly combative ones, should be incorporated into SIS?
5. If SIS has effects upon social relations, why is this treated as incidental?
6. What interests are served by determining, usually implicitly, that SIS is a discrete space?

Let me propose two examples, the first extreme, the second not so:

In the course of play, Jane's character, Linda, gets raped.  Jane is extremely upset about this, and she complains to the group.  Adam thinks she is not recognizing that this has happened to a character, and is taking it too personally.  Bill thinks she should make this situation into a kind of Premise, grappling with it as a social and moral problem.  Chris, the GM, decides that a line has been crossed, because social relations are getting hairy, and lays down the law that in future there will be no rapes.

In the course of play, John's character, Phil, gets into a fight with Sally's character, Megan.  John has the hots for Sally, and everyone knows it.  In fairly short order, Phil, a known hothead with a stubborn streak, backs down.  Dave thinks that John is bending his character inappropriately because John wants to get into Sally's pants.  Ernie thinks that John should make Phil's conflict with Megan into an important issue for them, which will smooth over relations by making this interesting rather than a pissing match.  Fred, the GM, decides that GM intervention would cause more trouble than it would solve, and so does nothing.

Both of these difficulties are predicated on the notion that the SIS is distinct from the social relations within the group.  But why should it be?  Chris's GM solution to the rape problem in effect asserts that Jane was right to complain, but does so by making her unpleasant experience a moot point.  Dave's gripe about John's play asserts that player and character must remain divorced, in a way not unlike the old IC/OOC knowledge problem.  I see these as manifestations of the same thing: just as a great many games and gamers have moved strongly away from the idea that IC/OOC knowledge is a necessary division, I think projecting social effects of the SIS outside it and then keeping them there by referring it all to Social Contract is atavistic and should long since have been dropped.

All right, that's enough yapping for one post.  But as a final note, I would point out that what I'm saying here is that the construction of the SIS as a discrete and distinctive space is a social effect, not a real thing.  It is precisely what is meant by "ritualization" in Catherine Bell's formulation.  If "ritual" is thus "shrug, reward system," as Ron says, then it appears that having an SIS at all is simply a reward system.  I argue, on the contrary, that the dynamic and tensive relationship between the social structures and the continuous construction of the SIS is something that requires close attention and analysis, and that the hierarchical, nested-boxes system of the Big Model can never achieve that.

Social mode may not be a CA, but that's because CA is ultimately part of a system that cannot face its own socially-constructed nature.

[Ron Edwards]

Hello,

Chris, I think you're entirely wrong in your assessment of the model, and that you've been wrong about this issue from the start.

There is nothing in the model that is not social. Every time you say something like "separated from the social situation," I have to stare, and usually, merely throw up my hands. There is nothing in the model that is not social.

All Exploration is kind of interaction which is describable in terms of the Social Contract. That's what the box-in-the-box means; otherwise, I'd draw it as one box with an arrow leading to the next one.

Once generated, a moment of the SIS doesn't exist separately from the Social Contract. It was created within it, remains in it, is assessed for "success" within it (and in Social Contract terms), and, significantly, it affects it, or rather, affects the rest of it.

A given technique is part and parcel of the SIS, and as such, is socially constructed, socially carried out, and socially assessed.

I really can't make head nor tail of your whole "separation from social" criticism - as I'm reading your post, and looking at the model, what you're saying is flatly wrong.

Would it help if I identified your discussion of ritual with the way the Reward System can be traced from its social outer layer through every layer, down to the moment (Ephemera) when, in a particular game, a person tallies some experience points onto his character sheet? And that one could also stay in the Social Contract level while looking at this event, and point to the interactions of the other people about it? 'Cause that's how I see it.

The "from" and "to" in that description are not temporal - they are merely conceptual layers, of a single social event which happens to include (a) communicating about an imaginary event, (b) a set of techniques which brought it into a state of agreement, and (c) a set of specific and momentary acts associated with each technique.

Creative Agenda describes how all of this is nailed together in mutual priorities, which is why it's so intimately associated with the reward system, and again, I see conducting that reward system, in action, as precisely the ritual element that you've written about.

Best,
Ron

[clehrich]

Chris, I think you're entirely wrong in your assessment of the model, and that you've been wrong about this issue from the start.

I'll go over the articles and explain this soon, in another thread.  I think you're misunderstanding, in that what I'm saying is not that the Big Model does not include a social dimension, right at the top, but that its hierarchical structure should be discarded.  To the extent that every element of the model continuously interacts with every other, and may dominate, control, and restructure any other, the nested boxes thing is silly.  You've got a list of elements that interact; where does the hierarchy come from?

But anyway, I'll get back to this in another thread -- unless Sean wants it here.

However:

Would it help if I identified your discussion of ritual with the way the Reward System can be traced from its social outer layer through every layer, down to the moment (Ephemera) when, in a particular game, a person tallies some experience points onto his character sheet? And that one could also stay in the Social Contract level while looking at this event, and point to the interactions of the other people about it? 'Cause that's how I see it. ... Creative Agenda describes how all of this is nailed together in mutual priorities, which is why it's so intimately associated with the reward system, and again, I see conducting that reward system, in action, as precisely the ritual element that you've written about.

No, that doesn't help me at all.  What does any of this have to do with ritual?  My concern has to do with the ways in which particular spaces and activities are delineated as special and different, distinct from other spaces and activities.  I don't see how tracing reward systems, or conducting them, is directly relevant.

As I say, we are clearly failing to communicate.  I say a couple of things about ritual and ritualization.  You reply with something that I can't see in any way related.  Someone is lost here, and possibly both of us.  What can I do to help?

[Jason Lee]

If I may be so bold, I believe I can paraphrase Chris' position.

The fact that everything in the model is a subset of the social interactions of the group doesn't seem to be the difference of opinion.  Instead, Chris' issue is that the social interactions are not also a subset of Exploration.  The nesting implying that the feedback between layers is unidirectional - from largest to smallest.  The model says that Social Contact shapes Exploration and Exploration shapes Techniques; but the model doesn't appear to say that Techniques shape Exploration and Exploration shapes Social Contact, because of the nesting.

This would require some sort of weird Escher-esque picture where Exploration is nested within Social Contact while Social Contact is nested within Exploration, or the abandonment of nesting.

As an analogy:

I believe Ron is describing a wolf as Organism -> Organ -> Tissue -> Cell.

While Chris appears be describing a wolf as something that eats deer, and because of this a deer is something that runs away from wolves, making wolves something that chases deer.

Sean is noticing that wolves chase deer, and trying to fit that into the model.  The model is saying, "Of course wolves can chase deer they are predators".  So Sean says, "But, why to they chase deer?"  So the model says, "Aren't you listening?  Of course they can chase deer!"

Hmmm...  that analogy kinda sucks.  Oh well, best I could come up with.

I hope I haven't put words in anyone's mouth.

This post is not necessarily the opinion of the author, but is instead just an attempt at clarification.

[Eero Tuovinen]

I just now realized that this dull thread about "story" and "narrative" is actually the thread about the social mode that started so promisingly. Talk about your tangent, I've read this for a week now without realizing that there's actually a point buried in there.

1. Possible Progress: I'm satisfied that the 'social mode' is not a CA. The reason is that role-playing always involves the shared imagined space and that the features of the shared imagined space which are getting emphasis are what constitute the CA of the game. Therefore, even in the applications I've been imagining, there's a clear reason to label the examples I've thought of as Gam, Nar, or Sim.

That's my position, yeah. The model as is doesn't comment on the why of play so much as how. The things the agendas define are not motivations for playing with these people, but rather hardwired features of pleasurable human interaction:
- Human psyche is constructed such that it defines itself in relation to others. Thus Gamism
- What we are and think is most concretely illustrated by value actions. Thus Narrativism.
- Curiousity is central to an active intellect and healthy psyche. Thus Simulationism.
Compare these features that are the CAs to possible social motivations of play. While the former defines the form play takes in our minds, the latter define why we play. There are many features to the CAs that flow from the fact of their being hardwired psychological forms: the incompatibility issue and the challenge of inventing new ones are two examples. By being something completely different from actual motivations the CAs are useful tools.

Now, the distinction above is muddled by there actually being social motivations that exactly mirror the CAs: when a player plays because he wants to show others who is best he is motivated by challenge and thus playing in the gamist CA. But the two are different things: one can end up in the gamist CA without going through the corresponding social motivation! The common example is the player who wants to conquer the game simply because that's what games are about: he is not doing it because of social challenge motivation, but simply because challenge is fun.

This reveals the inner structure of the CAs, in a sense. A player has to play in a certain manner to keep any interest in the game, simply because breaking the agenda makes the game pointless. Thus a gamist cannot cheat, as that would take the point of the game out. It's these structural issues that cause incompatibility between agendas and define them, not any social issues per se. A CA is simply a consistent form of interaction.

Due to the above I myself tend to think of Social Motivation as a trigger for play that is shaped into one of the CAs. The SMs can conseivably be catalogued to find out what reasons people would have for play, but that's pointless without some analyzing model: anything from boredom and informed self-entertainment to pedagogical and psychological purposes are possible reasons to take a rpg in hand.

There is however an important point for discussion here: the assumption of nearly all American thinking on rpgs is that they are essentially a form of entertainment. This is a Social Motivation, the most common and important of all SMs. The vantage that the three CAs are the only ones and equal in application is fully caused by this SM. It just so happens that GN and S are the three psychological models of "play" that are entertaining in application.

From the above viewpoint the question of additional agendas can be asked in a different form: is there a psychological mechanism (a CA) different from the three? If there should be, it's likely that it is accompanied by a different SM from entertainment, one which triggers other CAs.

The above reveals one theory of why we have three CAs: it's because we allways assume that the goal of game is entertainment, and thus discount any creative agendas that are not entertaining. It's possible that by choosing a different SM we can reveal other CAs, although ones not at all useful for entertainment purposes.

That's my take, anyway. As always, I don't think these through before posting, so take it with a grain of salt.


Now, as to how one can analyze a given instance of SM as pertains to GNS, an example: a group of people gather to play a game as a means of getting to know each other. What CAs are possibly triggered by such a SM?

A player could have a gamist CA, because he simply wishes to ascertain his status within the group. A group of children playing football for the first time might take it this seriously, as well as any group of serious strategy gamers: chess, bridge, Diplomacy and other games are focal pieces of whole subcultures, and it's imperative for new people to find out who is better.

A player could also have a narrativist CA, if he wanted to simply find out about the values of the other players and to tell about his own. This is seen frequently in less structured situations: people talk about issues and gauge each other based on them.

Finally, in my opinion "getting to know people" cannot trigger a simulationist agenda. The simulationist isn't interested in his fellow players, and thus a player interested in his fellows isn't simulationist.

However, is there other agendas, possible only for this SM? To uncover one we'd have to successfully recognize a socio-psychological mechanism (a CA) apart from the three and realize that it's perfect for getting to know people. There are many mechanisms, but is there any suitable for this situation? I cannot think of one right now, so I'll answer no. There are only two CAs triggered by "getting to know people", gamism and narrativism.

Similar consideration is possible for other SMs, too. For example, I'm pretty sure that there are definable CAs triggered by "learning" SM. As previously demonstrated "learning" can trigger all three entertainment CAs (although nar and gam are special cases), but there is probably others: how about oblicationism? A play decision is oblicationist when it's made to fulfill an outside duty like learning. Another possibility is intellectualism, wherein the player strives for understanding of the whole in their actions. These are of course the shallow and deep learning styles of basic theory, and probably not a good idea.

A common attribute of all such possible CAs is that they are not fun. That's the reason they are not recognized as CAs while we only consider "entertainment" SM. This also means that such considerations are irrelevant to majority of Forge discussion: why ever would one want to design a game supporting oblicationism, for example? Any such a game would have wast differences compared to any roleplaying game ever. It'd be like pedagogical or psychiatric roleplaying in turbo mode, actually. Modern rpg technology which does not try to be fun, heh...

Anyway, that's my piece on the matter of the "social mode". The social mode is actually a higher category of social stuff, called Social Motivation. It's the triggering cause of the psychological mechanisms called Creative Agenda and absolutely necessary for play. Creative Agenda is only social in the sense of being negotiable through talking about SMs, while all the other qualities commonly attributed are actually properties of the corresponding SMs. Thus I make CA actually a psychological phenomenon itself unreachable for observation, which quality Ron himself has remarked on some times.

Eero and Erling, you may (or may not) have more experience both of didactic oriented games and ones that may fit the "psychological examination" profile (ie where the focus is specifically on the personal development or internal experience of the player than many of us reading here. If you do, do you have any specific examples you may speak of? Or anyone else, of course.

The latter kind of game is a little bit personal to speak of in specific sense. I've done it, but not frequently. Let's just say that there are multiple ways of doing it (with possible CAs like "expositionism" and such), one of which is narrativist. One should remember that nar is so fun precisely because you get to talk about yourself.

In the pedagogic motivation I've some more experience. As previously intimated, I even wrote three games about it (damn, I'll have to translate those!). In general I find that gamist and simulationist agendas are the easiest, but as can be seen above, I'm exploring possible alternatives.

In your experiences with either of these types of games, have participants in them recognizably engaged in one of the three known creative agendas? Are there differences/similarities with standard entertainment oriented gaming that stand out to you? For example, what might the relationship be between didactic games and railroading, or with traditional games where the gm presents the challenge or premise to be addressed?

As said, I've seen definite nar in psych games. There is really not that much difference: a nar player wants to tell about his opinions and views through imaginary situations.

The ped games I've run do not really stand out that much, mainly because I've to date sought learning motivation from entertainment; by making the game fun to play too there's added incentive for the learning part. There is no special relationship between pedagogy and railroading: it's the crudest form of presenting learning material to just parade it before the players. Much better to make the players fellow conspirators in manipulating the game. The relationship with GM-defined premise is more interesting, being that GM controlled premise is very similar idea to the socratic dialogue.

I'm planning on writing an extensive piece on the concentration horizon, ars memorativa and the general pedagogy of roleplaying games in the summer, when I have time (if I have). Maybe even submit it as an article, who knows. I'll save my stuff 'till then ;)


And by the way, Chris and Ron: Ron's indeed misunderstanding the ritual thing, it seems to me. The ritual is not about the inner structure of play, but rather about the social requirements: the psychological mode required by the CAs to function is achieved in human interaction through ritual. You know, there's a bunch of stuff that cannot be done without making it clear that it's a roleplaying game: I would at least feel utterly foolish trying to kiss a forty-year old man outside of the game. But when the game is prepared in such a way that the local social contract allows it, I do it if appropriate. Very similar to how eating sacramental wafers is a big no-no outside the ritual of sacrament. The similarity is not a coincidence, seems to me.

Of course, one could see the "reward mechanic" as such a wide term that it includes any motivating factors at all that make the player do things. Then it'd be simple to define ritual as "mechanic that rewards participation", as there is no participation without the ritual, or at least it's more careful. Seems counterintuitive and clumsy to me, though.

[Eric J-D]

Just a brief followup to Chris and Jason's posts (sorry Eero to exclude yours, but I am still trying to digest its claims).

Would it help things at all if we understood the various boxes as being bounded by semi-permeable membranes rather than impermeable ones?  This is how I have tended to think of them.  In other words, does the nested boxes model work if we recognize that things flow from the boxes inside to the ones that surround them and vice versa?  Or are there other objections to the model that I am not seeing?

Now, I have always assumed that Ron intended the boundaries between the boxes to be semi-permeable rather than rigid, so if I am wrong about this I trust he will correct me.  However, I don't assume that understanding them as such will automatically resolve the difficulties Chris is trying to articulate.

Eric

[John Kim]

I think this has been touched on before in the http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?t=10119">exploration of self thread, and in particular Ron's http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?p=106285&highlight=#106285">third post to it.  

While the model allows that there can be social effects from Creative Agendas and Techniques, the model basically cannot say anthing about them.  Because of the hierarchical nesting, all of the detail of the model is inside of the Exploration box.  The social is a vast sea of undescribed space.  As for the rigidity of the boxes, they are definitional and thus inherently rigid in a sense.  i.e. If a Creative Agenda "leaked" out of the CA box and into the non-CA portion of the Social Contract box, then by definition it is no longer a Creative Agenda.

I would point as an alternative diagrams such as the information flow diagrams at the end of Liz Henry's http://www.darkshire.net/~jhkim/rpg/theory/liz-paper-2003/">Group Narration essay or from my http://www.darkshire.net/~jhkim/rpg/theory/narrative/paradigms.html">Narrative Paradigms essay.  These differentiate among meta-game level structures, such as between participants.  In contrast, all of the detail in the Big Model is inside of the Exploration box.  

I think this is reflected in much of the emphasis of the Big Model.  For example, I personally have always been puzzled by discussion of reward systems.  In the Big Model, reward systems are defined as being inside the Creative Agenda box.  But to me, the only motivating rewards are outside of the Exploration layer.  i.e. A game can define "brownie points", but that doesn't mean that I am motivated to collect them.  For example, in games of Paranoia and/or Call of Cthulhu, I have often seen players delight in losing points and collecting penalties like damage, insanity, and treason points.

[clehrich]

If I may be so bold, I believe I can paraphrase Chris' position.

The fact that everything in the model is a subset of the social interactions of the group doesn't seem to be the difference of opinion.  Instead, Chris' issue is that the social interactions are not also a subset of Exploration.  The nesting implying that the feedback between layers is unidirectional - from largest to smallest.  The model says that Social Contact shapes Exploration and Exploration shapes Techniques; but the model doesn't appear to say that Techniques shape Exploration and Exploration shapes Social Contact, because of the nesting.

You may certainly be so bold: that's precisely the point I wanted to make.  I'm quite interested in some of the incidental ramifications of this, which is why I think I've had trouble putting it as clearly as you just did.  Thanks!

Eero:

I'm going to hold off commenting on your remarks to me and Ron until I see what Ron has to say.

Eric:

Yes, I grant this permeability, if you like, but it's the hierarchy itself that bothers me.  If you say that they're all semi-permeable AND that they're sort of thrown into a messy heap to sort out priorities for themselves, then I'm with you.  But that nice neat structure of the Big Model strikes me as dubious.

While the model allows that there can be social effects from Creative Agendas and Techniques, the model basically cannot say anthing about them. Because of the hierarchical nesting, all of the detail of the model is inside of the Exploration box. The social is a vast sea of undescribed space. As for the rigidity of the boxes, they are definitional and thus inherently rigid in a sense. i.e. If a Creative Agenda "leaked" out of the CA box and into the non-CA portion of the Social Contract box, then by definition it is no longer a Creative Agenda.

Yet another stinker who puts it more clearly than me!  Yup, exactly.  As far as I'm concerned, if (as Ron says) all of RPG is a social activity, and a very complex one, and the Big Model is unable to say anything about how all that detail affects social dynamics, then it's not a very helpful model for my purposes.

And that brings me to a last point:

Insofar as you want a model that helps build RPGs, i.e. a design model, it does appear that the Big Model works pretty well; lots of people have found it so, after all.  But insofar as some of us (like me) want an analytical model that will help in understanding what RPGs are and how they work as dynamic social structures, I think the Big Model needs an overhaul.

BUT!

I think it's a really good start.  I do not think that the Big Model needs to be thrown away, at all.  I think it needs really tough challenging, and needs a good going over, and it may come out looking really very different as we go along, but it's the ONLY serious place to start, as far as RPG theory is concerned.