Altering the SIS in CRPG

[Christopher Weeks]

Finally, and this is one of the most telling points for me, the computer is incapable of assigning value in and of itself.  Fed algorithms and data it is capable of providing an excellent illusion of doing so, but ultimately the computer relies completely on external values.

Can't the same thing be said about a human baby? Does a baby have altruism, can it write poetry? :)

I don't think you're countering his point.  A baby can't play RPGs either.  In fact, depending on what age you mean, I suspect that James would agree that the computer is closer to being a player than the baby.  (Even if, with the passage of time, the baby will far surpass the computer's playerness.)

I'm willing to just agree to disagree with James.  I think that computers can't play well today, but can play (and will play well tomorrow).  I think the differences between electronic and biological brains are significant and numerous, but not enough to call them different things so adamantly.  And as James himself alluded to, I think the human brain is "incapable of assigning value in and of itself.  Fed algorithms and data it is capable of providing an excellent illusion of doing so, but ultimately the [brain] relies completely on external values."

Chris

[JamesSterrett]

Agreed on agreeing to disagree....

Though a quick note that "intelligence" is a slippery definition whose goalposts move in accordance with our egos.

The Victorians condiered logic to be the epitome of intelligence: playing chess well, for example, would be a distinct test.

By this metric, there are millions of chess-playing intelligences out in the world today.  We don't feel comfortable with the competition, and move the goalpost to fuzzier goals, such as "learning" and "creativity".

However, Deep Blue famously showed off a gambit no human had ever thought of before while beating Kasparov.  So we redefine this as "not creative" because it came from silicon, not from meat.


Computers generally aren't very bright, game programs are often written in a manner that's intentionally stupid*, and their field of competence is limited.  But I agree with M. J. Young - some time from now, we'll look back on these programs and see them as the early start of ones that we can no longer deny are intelligences.




*  AI in games is usually deliberately stupid because 1) human opponents want to win and 2) good AI takes time (and therefore money) to write; given #1, it is usually not cost-effective to write good AI.

[contracycle]

1. Hold an internale representation of the game stat (in RPGs, the imaginary space).

To the comoputer, its an output to the user.  The computer is like a roadie moving set elements around (I'm getting a vision of the Spinal Tap stonehenge for some reason).  All the computer really knows is that it has to draw cterain pixels under certain rule conditions, it doesn;t know or understand why.

2. Accept input from other participants.

If you tell your flunky "roll them bones" they would have accpeted input in the technical sense.  Rather like a computer accepting the insruction to draw a door as open and whatever is visible beyond it.

3. Make decisions based on this input and the stored representation of the game, to further in-game goals.

I don' think a computer can do that - all it can do is execute the programme which be more or less flexible in terms of the data it calls for.  The computer does not make decisions any more meaningful than rolling on a wandering monster table and applying the results.

4. Produce output to other perticipants and update the internal representation.

Many flunkies do thisa refree or linesman produces output (the off-side whistle) that updates the internal representation (I might not even see what happened, but the whistle tells me what kind of thing happened).

The dice roling assistant and the gopher from your examples don't even do one of these things, but computers can do all of them.

/No the die-rolling assistant is specifically providing a ceratin kind of output in response to input that wiull update the imaginary space.  The gopher is assisting with the depitction of the IS such that it is shared.  What a computer can do is a bunch of these flunky tasks, but I don't think the computer is a player - if the the computer is to be considered a participant, then the computer is a menial or slave.


Simon Hibbs[/quote]

[Christopher Weeks]

3. Make decisions based on this input and the stored representation of the game, to further in-game goals.

I don' think a computer can do that - all it can do is execute the programme which be more or less flexible in terms of the data it calls for.  The computer does not make decisions any more meaningful than rolling on a wandering monster table and applying the results.

I think that you have a much more sophisticated program and that's where the difference ends.  What makes a decision meaningful?

Chris

[Andrew Martin]

What makes a decision meaningful?

Upon observing history, in particular, concentration camps, I believe that meaningful decisions are meaningful to those people that make them. One can observe this in others by their attitude they take when placed in stressful circumstances.

[Callan S.]

Since this is still going, I'd like to add what I see as a distinction:

1. I write a piece of code. I write the code that in X situation (specified by me), it uses a kick attack.

2. I write some code, that uses possitive and negative feedback tied to certain inputs, to decide attack. It get's run against quite a few players and in Y situation, it uses a kick attack.

Number one is all me. Number two is perhaps half me and half life experience (life like an insect might experience). The more that code can and does learn from life experiences, the less its using a kick attack in certain circumstances is anything to do with me (its not half me, half it's life experiences. It's not much of me at all).

A human analogy might be: To a certain degree your reading my parents manner of thought right now. But at a practical level, it's me your reading, not them.

[simon_hibbs]

1. Hold an internale representation of the game stat (in RPGs, the imaginary space).

To the comoputer, its an output to the user.  The computer is like a roadie moving set elements around (I'm getting a vision of the Spinal Tap stonehenge for some reason).  All the computer really knows is that it has to draw cterain pixels under certain rule conditions, it doesn;t know or understand why.

Does it need to? All you seem to be saying is that computers aren't self-aware, which we know. But why does a computer, or any other system, need to be self aware, or aware of an external meta-context for a game, in order to be able to play that game?

If I write a program to play Monopoly, it doesn't know anything about real-world property or what a jail is, by does it need to know those things in order to play the game? I realy don't see why.

If you tell your flunky "roll them bones" they would have accpeted input in the technical sense.  Rather like a computer accepting the insruction to draw a door as open and whatever is visible beyond it.

That's true, but only in the sense that individual neorons in your brain fire in response to stimulation. They don't know whether they are triggering to process an auditory stimulation, or activating a leg muscle movement. If a computer doesn't play RPGs because a random number generator doesn't know the context of it's activity then I can say the same thing of you - individual parts of your body don't 'understand' the context in which they function. But is that understanding necessery in order for the funtion to exist?

3. Make decisions based on this input and the stored representation of the game, to further in-game goals.

I don' think a computer can do that - all it can do is execute the programme which be more or less flexible in terms of the data it calls for.

It follows an algorithm. Sometimes I follow algorithms, using definable strategies in my decision making. Sometimes this is because I've decided to do so, sometimes it's because I've been told to do so.

What a computer can do is a bunch of these flunky tasks, but I don't think the computer is a player - if the the computer is to be considered a participant, then the computer is a menial or slave.

It can do all of these tasks, functioning together to produce a complete behaviour. I call that behaviour 'playing the game' And yes you can disect each behaviour out of it's context, but that proves nothing.


Simon Hibbs

[Christopher Weeks]

[The computer] follows an algorithm. Sometimes I follow algorithms

Simon, you and I are largely in the same camp.  But I think what you wrote here is the crux of the opposition argument.  If you only follow algorithms sometimes, then there is some fundamental difference between you and a computer -- and it may well be the difference between being able and not being able to play an RPG in a meaningful sense.  But, I have no reason to believe that while our algorithms are tremendously complex we don't follow them all the time.

It's just a matter of degree.

And while some posters make a big deal out of today's technology while disclaiming that at some unforeseen date in the future things might change, I think that we all need to understand the root of our philosophical differences on this.  (e.g. If a "soul" is needed and you accept that such a thing exists, it might be more plausible to deny that a computer can ever have one.  At that point you (whomever) and I have less to talk about because we disagree about unsupportable stuff.)  If our manufactured computers are of like kind but different power level (orders of magnitude in my estimation) as our brain, then the stance that computers can't play is much weaker, perhaps even an accident of history or a misunderstanding of what "play" means.

Chris (who hopes he's not babbling)

[simon_hibbs]

Simon, you and I are largely in the same camp.  But I think what you wrote here is the crux of the opposition argument.

I suppose so, but it seems to me that the opposition argument boils down to the fact that computers have no soul, and therefore can't play roleplaying games. Now I'm a basicaly religious person, but even so the idea that playing a roleplaying game is somehow a religious act seems to me to be going a bit far.


Simon Hibbs

[contracycle]

If our manufactured computers are of like kind but different power level (orders of magnitude in my estimation) as our brain, then the stance that computers can't play is much weaker, perhaps even an accident of history or a misunderstanding of what "play" means.

That was the substance of my argment; not that computers are in principle incapable of playing games, but that computers as they exist today do not do so.

Simon Hibbs wrote:

Does it need to? All you seem to be saying is that computers aren't self-aware, which we know. But why does a computer, or any other system, need to be self aware, or aware of an external meta-context for a game, in order to be able to play that game?

Becuase PLAY is a purposeful activity.  It must be chosen and self-initiated.  Furthermore, I think games are heavily related to our history of predation of which computers have none.

If I write a program to play Monopoly, it doesn't know anything about real-world property or what a jail is, by does it need to know those things in order to play the game? I realy don't see why.

Becuase  without knownig those things it is just completing a task like any other.  It matters not to the computer whether the operation it is carrying out is sorting and index or moving a chit.  For game playing to be meaningful, it must be a purposeful activity engaged in for fun.  Computers do not, at present, have any such behavioral capacity.

That's true, but only in the sense that individual neorons in your brain fire in response to stimulation. They don't know whether they are triggering to process an auditory stimulation, or activating a leg muscle movement. If a computer doesn't play RPGs because a random number generator doesn't know the context of it's activity then I can say the same thing of you - individual parts of your body don't 'understand' the context in which they function. But is that understanding necessery in order for the funtion to exist?

Correct; individual parts of me do not.  Only the holistic synthesis that is Me, a being with life and thought, is capable of playing games.  That synthesis is IMO an emergent [property of the underlying complexity.  That is why I expect mahcines will at some point reach similar complexity, but that until they do so they cannot be said to be players.

It follows an algorithm. Sometimes I follow algorithms, using definable strategies in my decision making. Sometimes this is because I've decided to do so, sometimes it's because I've been told to do so.

Hmm, yes and no.  I'm in the school of thought that primarily sees your diversion from an algorithm only as the expression of another algorithm.  But I will accept the statement as it stands and respond that WHEN computers also exhibit that flexibility, then they can be said to be players.  But they do not exhibit it now.  At that point they will probably be as fully self aware as you or I.

[Christopher Weeks]

Out of curiosity, how would you test an entity (computer, alien, uplifted animal, another person, whatever) for the ability to play?  

Chris

[simon_hibbs]

Becuase PLAY is a purposeful activity.  It must be chosen and self-initiated.  Furthermore, I think games are heavily related to our history of predation of which computers have none.

It's an activity, but any purpose we ascribe to it is a subjective contextual element. The act of play exists independently of that context.

Becuase  without knownig those things it is just completing a task like any other.

Yes.

It matters not to the computer whether the operation it is carrying out is sorting and index or moving a chit.  For game playing to be meaningful, it must be a purposeful activity engaged in for fun.  Computers do not, at present, have any such behavioral capacity.

To be meaningful to us it does yes, but merely to exist, no. In fact it is meaningful to us. I can say 'this computer is playing an RPG' even though at a metrialist level all it's doing is shuffling electrons. 'Playing an RPG' is a subjective meaning I ascribe to it's activities, but it's just as meaningful as my ascribing the same behaviour to any 'black box' engaged in a game, whether the box contains a person or a computer. I don't see why the computer being 'aware' of this is relevent.


Simon Hibbs

[contracycle]

It's an activity, but any purpose we ascribe to it is a subjective contextual element. The act of play exists independently of that context.

I don't think thats true at all.  You can watch a kitten play at chasing moms tail and recognises it as play easily enough.  IMO, play is a specific behaviour in its own right, and it does not exist independantly of that context.

The point I was trying to make is that it is not an ontological dinstinciton that makes sophisticated behaviour sophisticated behaviour, its an epiphenomenon arising from complexity.  I don't think computers are presently sufficiently complex to do the things we call play.  It is the argument that quantittaive changes result in qualitative changes; IMO computers are not qualitatively sophisticated enough to play (and arguably, neither are some creatures, in that I'm not aware of any insect behaviour that is play-like.)

[M. J. Young]

And I thought this subject was dead; Gareth has added an entirely new wrinkle to it.

If I understand correctly, Gareth wants to distinguish

Goes through all the necessary activities of playing a game[/list:u]from
Chooses to play and derives enjoyment from doing so.[/list:u]
I find it a fascinating distinction; but it seems to sidestep the question I raised. That is, if a computer can go through all the necessary activities of playing a game, can it not be said to be a player? I suggested that a computer can retain the information of an imagined space, can communicate what it imagines to the other players, can accept input regarding how the other players would alter the shared imagined space, can itself suggest changes to the shared imagined space which are confined within the limits of what is acceptable within the game, and can negotiate to adjust that shared imagined space if there is disagreement. I further suggested that these are the necessary elements of "play" in a role playing game.

Gareth is suggesting, I think, that even if it can do all these things and it does them on command, the fact that it cannot initiate play and cannot enjoy play prevents it from being a player. Thus, Whopper in WarGames is playing, because it suggests games and likes to play. Then again, that's got to be taken as a programmed personality, not a computer's own decision-making capability. Further, we can never reach a point where we could distinguish what a computer does because of its programming and what it chooses to do for its own enjoyment--in one sense, there might not be a difference, if we assume that a computer waiting for an input is in an unresolved state, and that a resolved state is satisfaction, which is to be preferred.

So I'm not at all sure how we resolve the question of whether the computer "enjoys" playing or "chooses" to play.

I'm also not sure of this. If I insert a CD in my PS2 and it loads and waits for me to sit down and play, how is that different from the guy at the pool who sits at a table by a chess board waiting for someone to sit across from him and play chess? The difference, of course, is that I loaded the game in the PS2; but is that sufficient to say that the PS2 is not playing the game?

What is it that a computer has to do to be a player, and how do we know whether it can do that?

--M. J. Young

[contracycle]

OK, well, I think you have encapsulated my argument very well.  

So lets take the chess/PS2 example.  I'd agree that from the perspective of your subjective experience, the computer is succesfully fulfilling the role of opponent, and thus you are able to play.  In a blind test, you may not be able to determine whether your opponent was a computer or a person.  But unlike a human opponent, the computer does not invest their self-worth in the game, there is no esteem at risk, and no kudos for victory or jeers for defeat.  So it seems to me that the computer is incapable of getting the same out of the game as the human player, and does not share the subjective experience of the human player.

A point that I wanted to raise in recent discussions about esteem, personal and social, as it applies to gamism, is that in order to examine that I think we need to step back a bit and examine the broader context again.  If I have no local applause to validate success, how do I know what success is in the first place?  I know that because I have knowledge of others peoples capabailities and I can and do measure myself against them.  Even if my competitive behaviour is in total isolation, I still have an assesment of the abilities of others against which to compare my own peformance.

Thus it seems to me that you can sit down at a PS2 and have an idea of whether you solved the puzzle quickly or slowly.    I greatly enjoyed the game The Incredible Machine, which had kinda abstract engineering puzzles for you to solve.  There was a huge amount of satisfaction to be had from simply achieving the goal of solving the puzzle, but any assesment of relative perfomance could only be carried out by discussing when and where we got stuck for how long.  The computer was presenting me with a problem, yes, but it was not really my opponent, because my failure would mean nothing to it in any sense.  It would have no basis for or knowledge of comparison to other computers; comparison to humans would be meaningless, a sense or 'mental' state that would find these comparisons relevant does not seem to me to exist.  I'm not asserting that a sense of competition or comparison is actually necessary for play, but some of why I think the subjective experience of a game is IMO very very different for us and for (modern) computers.

IMO, a computer will only enjoy, and choose, in the senses we mean, when it is self aware, that is, is an AI.  At that point, concepts like "competition" or "success" or "victory" will become meaningful.  But a modern chess computer, even though it is built to provide a challenge, does not and can not care what the outcome of the game is, either success or defeat.