Classifying By Social Function

[John Kim]

My argument rather is that IMO it lends itself to this social function rather less well than wholly external works, which do not invoke the audiences consent until the end.  As a result there seems to me to be more room (in such works) to perform the kind of exercises where you set up up a challenge with an apparent solution and then demonstrate that this solution is actually worse than another, less conventional solution.  The reason for this is the audience has essentially no choice but to stick with the singular and remote author until they make it all the way to the conclusion, at which point they can then pass judgement on the implied argument as a whole.

This is an interesting point.  It seems that the style of role-playing would be a factor in how much this is true.  i.e. All role-playing is consensual, but there are varying degrees of centrality of authorship.  This is one of the axes of the http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?t=12460">3D Model, though some centralized play includes Illusionism and Participationism.  So a game with greater centrality of authorship would mean that a point can be more completely made.  

This reminds me of the "Immortal Tales" game which I played with Chris Lehrich, Mark Kobrak, and David Covin.  That was played using a variant of Theatrix, and it was fairly centralized -- i.e. the GM pretty much controlled the plot.  However, we rotated in troupe style so each player took a turn as GM.  This perhaps would be a more effective forum for showing challenging points of view, as compared to games with a high degree of player control.  

Hmm... what I see as emerging after a chellenging Nar session is a stronger set of norms within the group than at the outset, whether or not the norms are the same as they were before the session, if that makes sense. The beliefs of the members of the group regarding the premise will be more clearly defined, if different from how they were at the outset.

I can contrast that to Sim play which, to my mind, serves to reinforce through acceptance, rather than reinforce through challenge.

It seems to me that this is a possible outcome of Narrativism, but not the only one.  GNS Narrativism doesn't define a relation to player's real-world social norms.  i.e. What is required is that the player make an answer that addresses Premise, but it need not be her real-world view.  So I think real-world beliefs aren't necessarily clarified to the group -- though there could be a subset of Narrativism where this is true.  So, some Narrativist play will challenge and clarify to the group what each players' ethics are.  

This is important because there is the alternate function of the game being a ritual space where the players can try on different beliefs or behaviors without judgement or consequence.  This is a contradictory goal, it seems to me.  i.e. If the goal is to expose, clarify, and reinforce the players' real-world ethics, then they should not feel free to act out differently from their real-world ethics.  

However, I feel that the relaxed ritual space still has consequences.  Yes, doing something in an RPG is not the same as doing it in real life.  However, playing in an RPG can and does affect people's relationships and outlooks.

[clehrich]

This is important because there is the alternate function of the game being a ritual space where the players can try on different beliefs or behaviors without judgement or consequence.  This is a contradictory goal, it seems to me.  i.e. If the goal is to expose, clarify, and reinforce the players' real-world ethics, then they should not feel free to act out differently from their real-world ethics.

On the contrary, this is a fairly classic way for ritualization to operate.

Victor Turner's theory of initiation rituals and what he liked to call "liminality" (following Van Gennep, Les rites de passage) emphasized exactly this dimension.  He gives the example of Ndembu kingship rites, what you might call "coronation" rites, called kanongesha.  In one stage of this, the king-to-be is stripped of all his badges of office (as a prince or whatever), and in fact stripped naked, then tossed into a muddy pit beside the road.  Everyone in the society is encouraged to come and revile him -- words only -- to the best of their abilities.  Spitting is occasionally observed.  Physical violence or degradation (e.g. urinating on him) is not permitted.

Now the Ndembu say that the point of this is to remind the man that he is only a man after all, so that once he gets to be king he will understand and defend the oppressed and the poor.  Turner was no functionalist, but you might call this the "purpose."

Turner's analysis suggests that at the same time (this would be function, not apparent to the Ndembu) this operates precisely to underscore the absolute authority of the king upon his coronation.  Very simplistically (just because I don't want to go into the details here) you might say that because ordinary folks have had an opportunity to "get in their digs" at the king during the kanongesha, they have to accept that they won't be able to do this again during his kingship.  In short, this ritualization process that distinguishes the kanongesha from all other times and spaces also stresses certain rules that must never be violated precisely by permitting their violation during the ritual.  To put it differently, the ritual, by giving the illusion of freedom, deceives the people into thinking that they have in some sense chosen to accept their king's inviolate position.

Thus ritual spaces are excellent places to do radical and unorthodox things without ever actually challenging -- and in fact actually strengthening -- social norms.  This was part of what I was getting at in my ritual essay: from one perspective at least, gaming, by deflecting a desire for political action or change into a protected ritual space, gives the illusion of having actually done something and thus serves a potentially conservative social function.  I'm not wedded to that, because I think there are so many other dimensions at the same time, but it's worth considering.

[John Kim]

This is important because there is the alternate function of the game being a ritual space where the players can try on different beliefs or behaviors without judgement or consequence.  This is a contradictory goal, it seems to me.  i.e. If the goal is to expose, clarify, and reinforce the players' real-world ethics, then they should not feel free to act out differently from their real-world ethics.

On the contrary, this is a fairly classic way for ritualization to operate.
...
Thus ritual spaces are excellent places to do radical and unorthodox things without ever actually challenging -- and in fact actually strengthening -- social norms.  This was part of what I was getting at in my ritual essay: from one perspective at least, gaming, by deflecting a desire for political action or change into a protected ritual space, gives the illusion of having actually done something and thus serves a potentially conservative social function.  I'm not wedded to that, because I think there are so many other dimensions at the same time, but it's worth considering.

Hmmm.  I agree with what you wrote here.  I also don't see how we're disagreeing, though.  It seems to me that the Ndembu ritual which you describe demonstates my point.  It does not, in fact, expose and clarify people's real-world ethics.  i.e. If there are tribe members who are actually rebellious will act the same as many others.  It may have an aggregate effect of reinforcing social norms, but it does not expose and clarify the true ethics of participants.  If anything, it hides them via the illusion you describe.  

Perhaps this is a miscommunication?  i.e. I said "expose, clarify, and reinforce" -- and you interpreted that I was saying that such ritual couldn't reinforce?  The "expose" and "clarify" are essential to my statement, and I agree that the ritual space can reinforce norms while also allowing such acting out.  

Gary Fine, in his book Shared Fantasy found that the role-playing games which he studied did not have this element of reversal.  i.e. The in-game power and status relations mirrored the out-of-game power and status relations.  This seems consistent with my experience.  The game would generally reinforce the existing relations.  Challenges could take place within the game, and these would be microcosms for a real-world challenge.  So, for example, if someone's character tries to take over as party leader, that expresses his desire to take over the status of the current leader's player.  

Now, this may not be true of all games.  Perhaps some games are reversals like the ritual you describe.  A game which encourages director-stance power for players might give the illusion of power while still implicitly reinforcing the social power of the GM.  Then there is troupe-style play, which may be similar.

[Mike Holmes]

I'm coming in late, and not to be too much of a bastard, but in terms of looking at the relationship of GNS modes to social reasons for performing them, previously the thought was that such motives were multi-variate. That is, I agree with Marco that there seem to be many social reasons why to play in any particular mode. In fact, GNS is strongly said to be a behavioral model, since it only speaks to where the conflicts in the observed behaviors occur, not in terms of why the person wants the behavior in the first place.

Which is to say that if this is true, then no one to one can be found. Indeed, it's likely that there are many reasons for wanting, say, simulationism. All GNS says is that, in not getting their desire met, the player desiring simulationism will be unsatisfied. It specifically does not say what that desire is.

So aren't we looking for something here that can't exist?

That's not to say that the social reasons don't exist - I'd say that every one mentioned so far does exist, in fact. Just that you're not going to find any subset that's creates a model of mutually exclusive drives. Meaning that, yeah, I might come to play a gamism sort of game in order to compete in order to feel supported by my peers in the competitive environment, and to have the catharsis of victory. Yadda, yadda.

Mike

[John Kim]

Indeed, it's likely that there are many reasons for wanting, say, simulationism. All GNS says is that, in not getting their desire met, the player desiring simulationism will be unsatisfied. It specifically does not say what that desire is.

So aren't we looking for something here that can't exist?

That's not to say that the social reasons don't exist - I'd say that every one mentioned so far does exist, in fact. Just that you're not going to find any subset that's creates a model of mutually exclusive drives. Meaning that, yeah, I might come to play a gamism sort of game in order to compete in order to feel supported by my peers in the competitive environment, and to have the catharsis of victory. Yadda, yadda.

I thought I was clear about this from the start.  I am not looking exclusively for a one-to-one correspondence with GNS, nor do I expect to find one.  What I am looking for is some model and/or loose terminology to express distinctions in social function.  The categories don't have to be binary on/off or perfectly mutually exclusive.  But they have to say something more than a blanket statement like "all games serve several social functions".  

Not all role-playing games will have exactly the same social functions.  So I want to be able to talk about what social functions a game serves, and most importantly how it differs from a different game's social functions.  I think that these distinctions may be important for understanding games in practice.

[Mike Holmes]

Well, I understand that this was said at the start. Yet somehow lots of options have been rejected for "GNS-ish" reasons. Like it can't be catharsis, because that's a subset of support. Why aren't these both social reasons simply on different levels?

Put another way, it seems like you're trying to generate a model of some sort, but other than "it probably doesn't have anything to do with GNS" we don't really know what the model is supposed to be about. If it's just a lilst of reasons, why reject any? What criteria are being used here?

Mike

[John Kim]

Well, I understand that this was said at the start. Yet somehow lots of options have been rejected for "GNS-ish" reasons. Like it can't be catharsis, because that's a subset of support. Why aren't these both social reasons simply on different levels?

Put another way, it seems like you're trying to generate a model of some sort, but other than "it probably doesn't have anything to do with GNS" we don't really know what the model is supposed to be about. If it's just a lilst of reasons, why reject any? What criteria are being used here?

Well, I'm open to comment on this.  However, my main criterion has been that it has to be a social function.  So I don't accept categories which are based on what happens in the fictional space (i.e. whether the transcript has a genre or theme, whether the theme was pre-created, etc.).  It has to be based on what happens to the people (and their social relations) after the game.  

I also want to at least acknowledge redundancy and overlap among suggestions.  That's not rejecting reasons, IMO, but rather trying to put them in relation to each other.  i.e. If there are two suggestions like "competition" and "contest", I'd like to at least note that they seem highly overlapping.  What I said about catharsis was just...

So what do you think about Support and/or Problem-solving and/or White Rat's suggestion Catharsis.  Should they all be distinct?  On the one hand, I suppose Support and Catharsis are both ways of helping individuals through their problems.  i.e. So you might go to a support group only for a limited period of time.  The group is there to support the individuals through a process, but may dissolve thereafter.  Catharsis feels rather more specific, and it seems like it overlaps with Support (i.e. you can have a moment of release at least very much like catharsis within a group).  I'm not sure if Support is a good word, but I think these two belong together.

I don't feel like this is arbitrary rejection of Catharsis.  I'm just trying to establish the boundaries and/or overlap with Support.

[clehrich]

... That is, I agree with Marco that there seem to be many social reasons why to play in any particular mode. In fact, GNS is strongly said to be a behavioral model, since it only speaks to where the conflicts in the observed behaviors occur, not in terms of why the person wants the behavior in the first place.

Which is to say that if this is true, then no one to one can be found. Indeed, it's likely that there are many reasons for wanting, say, simulationism. All GNS says is that, in not getting their desire met, the player desiring simulationism will be unsatisfied. It specifically does not say what that desire is.

So aren't we looking for something here that can't exist?

No, you're taking GNS as a known fact and a complete model, whereas the question of social function assumes as a given that GNS, like any other form of meaning or purpose, is important data but not itself a scientific model of what happens.

The whole point of a functionalist model would be to observe empirically what does in fact happen socially, and totally disregard everything else.  There may be problems with such a model, but your criticism misses the mark.  For example, "there are many reasons for wanting, say, simulationism."  Sure, that's probably true, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with the social function of gaming.  It presumes that simulationism is a specific and absolute type of gaming, which is precisely what a functionalist model would have to assume was not true until proven otherwise.

For example, let's say the natives say there are three kinds of ritual: earth, air, and fire.  We then come along with our functionalist model and say that there are two kinds of ritual, clan-unificatory and tribe-divisive.  Your criticism in effect says that because there are three different reasons for doing ritual (earth, air, fire) this binary division misses the point.  The functionalists would in effect say that the native division is interesting but not decisive, and that the natives are focused on purpose and meaning and simply don't see the function at all.  I think they'd say that your critique falls into the native camp, denying function and promoting purpose and meaning in its stead.  But these things are simply not the same.

In essence, your criticism is that because a social-function model does not track onto GNS, it's invalid.  That's apparently not what you think you're saying, but please go back and read what you've actually said.  If you find that you didn't mean what you said, and want to clarify, I want to hear about it.  But my suspicion is that you're taking GNS as a known division within gaming, which is something that would have to be discarded as "native testimony" before beginning any serious functionalist model.

And if, by the way, you're thinking that a model that doesn't take into account native testimony is invalid, you have a point.  But to move forward, we'd have to go straight into Structuralism.  Until we have Functionalism down pat, I don't think we really want to make the move, and we'd have little basis for it anyway.

[contracycle]

This is an interesting point.  It seems that the style of role-playing would be a factor in how much this is true.  i.e. All role-playing is consensual, but there are varying degrees of centrality of authorship.  This is one of the axes of the 3D Model, though some centralized play includes Illusionism and Participationism.  So a game with greater centrality of authorship would mean that a point can be more completely made.  

Yes, exactly.  Hence one of my driving interests, the attempt to formulate a methodology of organised, directed play that is neither scripted nor rail-roaded.  It is not that I want to create a better railroad, but rather that I want to find a structure that allows a gaming group to accept a package en bloc, go through it, experience it, and be able to comment on it.  

To a degree, we have a tendency to grant "credibility on credit" based on peoples social prestige.  One form of social prestige that is relevant here is that of the published author.  This is dubious on a number of levels but nevertheless, many are called but few are chosen to have their ideas mass produced in print.  I think that the credibility granted to a GM playing in the here-and-now may well be qualified by other, personal concerns arising from the players personal knowledge of the GM.  A sort  of "familiarity breeds contempt" argument.  And this can mean that the real live GM carries LESS credibility to make norm-challenging statements than a published author through their published work.

It is important that a GM aspiring to present players with ethical positions, appreciations of the world, that confront local norms should be able to DISclaim responsibility for the position, so that the position can be analysed WITHOUT reference to the GM's credibility.  Even if the GM's credibility is only masked by that of the published author, that at least allows an initially hostile reaction to be temporarily transposed to the author, hopefully for long enough for the whole peice to be executed, and the consuming audience to become fully equipped to follow the argument.

--

It has to be said though that I was hoping that someone would pick up the gauntlet I threw down in front of Pete and advance an argument that the very act of portrayal, of playing out, provides some grounds for claiming a genuine confrontation of worldviews even in the cuddliest of gaming groups.  It seems to me there is some truth to this, on the basis that THINKING a position is very different to STATING a position.  Your private thoughts are your own, and can be rationalised and adapted as circumstances demand.  But every word that comes out of your mouth takes on an existance independant of you, hangs around in other peoples memories.  Therefore, committing to an actual statement, a public pronouncement, requires (usually) rather more attention and deliberation than merely thinking a thought.  A case can be made, therefore, that the act of play in RPG prompts otherwise unlikely statements from players, and can thus serve to provoke introspection and the questioning of previous certainties.

[pete_darby]

Okay, taking on board all that gone on overnight, and to try to make this as short as possible...

I absolutely agree that, in address of premise, players may assume, personate or adopt externally value systems they themselves do not share. I also believe that, in assessing the play, they will bring to bear their own values and beliefs and test the one against the other, and, inside the group, I believe the tendency will be to reinforce the current norms of the group. While in play, while "freely" engaged in addressing premise according to or against their own norms, the norms will be applied in assessment of the events of the SiS.

In my old "actual play" case for this, I was improvising a dialogue with Polonius in Hamlet, where I was answering the question "If you saw Hamlet raping your daughter, would you stop him?" The answer was "Well, i certainly wouldn't watch." Now that was absolutley, 100% right for the interpretation of the character, but the director called a halt right there, as everybody was too freaked out, but oddly pleased with how right it was. The norms were brought to judgement of the imagined actions, but only when it was made clear that the protected space of the impro session was removed.

So even when there is a ritual space with "freedom of expression" (and some talk of lines is probably appropriate here, and possibly kpfs), there are limits to the expression, and a judgement of those expressions afterwards which has a tendency to normalize ethical or taste standards in the group.

However, back to Gareth, the act of conscious examination of troublesome external issues within the ritual space can, I think, cause at least a thoughful revision of attitudes towards those issues outside the ritual space, especially given the presence of judgement of those attitudes inside a "free" environment by others, who, in this environment, may be more likely to take up unpopular positions if they feel their not bound by the rules outside the ritual space.

So, over time, the attitudes may be normalized within the group, but this may involved moving away from the norms of greater society outside the group.

[Marco]

For example, let's say the natives say there are three kinds of ritual: earth, air, and fire.  We then come along with our functionalist model and say that there are two kinds of ritual, clan-unificatory and tribe-divisive.  Your criticism in effect says that because there are three different reasons for doing ritual (earth, air, fire) this binary division misses the point.  The functionalists would in effect say that the native division is interesting but not decisive, and that the natives are focused on purpose and meaning and simply don't see the function at all.  I think they'd say that your critique falls into the native camp, denying function and promoting purpose and meaning in its stead.  But these things are simply not the same.

I think this is sort of the whole GDS/GNS dichotomy in a nutshell. I don't know that GDS has anything to do with social function per-se but I think that the social function might best be examined in sort of GDS terms: i.e. techniques (under the Big Model).

-Marco

[Mike Holmes]

In essence, your criticism is that because a social-function model does not track onto GNS, it's invalid.

Nope.

How can you say that after my further discussions with John? I'm arguing that there should not be a tracking, not that it doesn't track. Rather, I completely agree, and it was my point that two or more reasons could be attributed to any mode. What I'm criticizing is that, despite protests that we shouldn't think this way, I keep reading posts saying, "X isn't what narrativism is about, Y is!" When both could be the case.

John, I get your overlapping point, but, again, that seems to me like you're trying to create a model of atomic base elements so that we can discuss how X is competition categorized, and not Support. Well, I can't see any reason for this, since we all agree that multiple things could be behind any CA. Why not use all of the terms available? What is gained by limiting the terms in this case to a smaller set?

I may be way off base, but it smacks of trying to come up with a model that speaks to mutually exclusive bahaviors or something. If you can give me another reason, and what your criteria are for discovering the terms, I'll be right there looking for them.

How about some of the following:

[*]Human Contact (not for support, the mere presence of other humans is social)
[*]Building Relationships (sexual, platonic, networking, other)
[*]Education/Teaching
[*]Communal Creativity (if it's not the art created, it's the fun of making the art with others)
[*]Playtesting/Demoing (possibly for eventual monetary gain - is this support?)[/list:u]I selected the above in part because I suspect that many or all of these will not pass some criteria - but I'm not sure why. I think the fact that the thread started with "this may or may not have anything to do with GNS" has been problematic so far. Just what are we talking about here.

To be clear, I think John is on to something important. It just seems that we're not sure what we're looking at at this point. At the very least, I'm not sure.

Mike

[John Kim]

What I'm criticizing is that, despite protests that we shouldn't think this way, I keep reading posts saying, "X isn't what narrativism is about, Y is!" When both could be the case.  

I agree 100% about this.  I guess I haven't been loud enough in disagreeing with these, but I meant that.  

John, I get your overlapping point, but, again, that seems to me like you're trying to create a model of atomic base elements so that we can discuss how X is competition categorized, and not Support. Well, I can't see any reason for this, since we all agree that multiple things could be behind any CA. Why not use all of the terms available? What is gained by limiting the terms in this case to a smaller set?  

Well, focus.  I mean, for the same reason that threads have topics, or any of the other models (like Stance or GNS or 3D) have a limited set of terms.  I mean, call me the oppressive hegemonist for stamping out the perfectly valid term like "chocolate" for describing games.  It's a valid term, but it's not part of what I want to talk about here.  The topic here for discussion is "social function" -- and I want to analyze and clarify suggested terms and how they relate to each other, not just make a random association word list of any terms that can be used to describe games.  

How about some of the following:

[*]Human Contact (not for support, the mere presence of other humans is social)
[*]Building Relationships (sexual, platonic, networking, other)
[*]Education/Teaching
[*]Communal Creativity (if it's not the art created, it's the fun of making the art with others)
[*]Playtesting/Demoing (possibly for eventual monetary gain - is this support?)[/list:u]I selected the above in part because I suspect that many or all of these will not pass some criteria - but I'm not sure why. I think the fact that the thread started with "this may or may not have anything to do with GNS" has been problematic so far.

OK, I think that I see some disconnect, which is caused some by lack of clarity on my part.  It seems you're talking about personal reasons for gaming, i.e. why we play.  But I'm trying for something more like a functionalist view -- i.e. what is the effect of play on the players, rather than why the players choose to play.  

However, Chris Lehrich correctly pointed out that I wasn't clear about this.  i.e. There is Purpose (i.e. personal reason), which is different than Meaning and Function.  For example, in my first post I suggested Celebration as a category of function.  However, it isn't obvious what the effect of celebration is.  I think it does have effects -- for example, it may strengthen communal bonds by encouraging a shared sense of identity.  But I wasn't clear about that.  I chose it as a recognizable label for a type of social function, but without discussing much what that function is.  

So, considering your suggestions.  "Building Relationships" is definitely social function, and I think that needs to be mentioned.  It is pretty general, though.  I'd distinguish betwen "Establishing new relationships" (i.e. the game as a mixer) and changes to existing relationships.  For example, a Contest changes social relations by allowing status to be gained or lost.  

"Playtesting" is a focus on creating a lasting product -- i.e. the system or setting or module which is being written up.  It is definitely valid as a type, and in addition it seems related to my category of Craft (originally Work).  "Demoing" is also related, I think, though not quite the same.  "Education/Teaching" is a little tricky.  It is a lasting effect, but it is often a personal effect rather than a social effect.  

On the other hand, "Human Contact" doesn't imply an effect on the participants.  The same is true of "Communal Creativity".  Those are reasons why people might say the game is fun -- but they don't suggest any effect on the people or their social relations.

[Gelasma]

OK, I think that I see some disconnect, which is caused some by lack of clarity on my part.  It seems you're talking about personal reasons for gaming, i.e. why we play.  But I'm trying for something more like a functionalist view -- i.e. what is the effect of play on the players, rather than why the players choose to play.

When a group chooses to play a Sim game in a historical setting to learn more about that time, wouldn't then be Education the effect on the players? And if not, what else would be the social function of that game? I cant find any other matching category - unless you specify Education as subcategory of Work. But Education does not produce a product, as the new term Craft suggests, but improves the players.

I think Education is a category if its own. Since if someone is more educated not only the person changes but also its behaviour towards other people and its social environment. Especially if its some kind of "moral education" - and cant Nar play be seen as moral education? If you adress a moral permisse, you ask a moral question and get, trough play, answers to that question and hence become moral educated.

And futhermore, to get back to the example with the Sim game, if one of the players is an expert in historical weapons, the other in historical customs and even another in historical events - wouldnt then Teaching each other be the function of play? And maybe in addition, each of these players just learned that subjects for the purpose of that game, so we would also have Learing. As the reason why these players do that, I see "thirst for knowledge" (is that the correct term for "Wissbegierde"?) and not education, or its two subcategories teaching and learing, itself.



PS: I'm Swissgerman and this is my first longer post in English, so excuse my maybe a bit simple language.

[Mike Holmes]

Ok, thanks John. That's a bit clearer at least for me. Stil a tad abstruse, but I think I see where you're going.

I think that by including "Building Relationships" as a potential social reason, that you definitely sever this from any specific link to CA. That is, I don't see that reason for play being satisfied by any of the creative act itself, and so, as such, I see it as unrelated to CA.

So, what I propose, very simply, is that when identifying a social function, that it can be labeled as CA affecting, or non-CA affecting. Meaning that the function either "skewers" down the mode level (to use an Edwardsism) and perhaps further, or it resides enitirely at the social level of function. In fact, if one wanted, one could specify the particular level down to which the function was likely to skewer. Some might go as far as ephemera, even - I haven't thought it out that far.

I'm sure that it'll be hit and miss to start, and we might even find that you can't make such a specific linkage in each case. But it gives us a way to, I believe, coherently relate the subject back to the overal model.

Which is to say, that if I'm correct here, the proper thing to say is something like, "Catharsis may be one function that skewers down to CA level, and specifically calls for narrativism at that level."

Make sense?

Mike