GNS, Intent and Motivations

[contracycle]

Where in "GNS and Other Matters of Role-Playing Theory" does it say that GNS modes are represented only by behavior?  quote]

Dunno.  Would putting that in as clarification solve the disagreement?  Ron's call of course but would that clarity resolve the problem?

[M. J. Young]

Apparently the problem is that "motive" means something to me that it does not mean to Ron; so, it seems, does "intent" and "attitude".

My problem is still this:

There is always a distinction between what he did and why he did it.

What he did is behavior; it is observable. Why he did it is not behavior; it cannot be observed, but can only be inferred from evidence.

What he did, by itself, never in any single or multiple case points to gamism, or to narrativism, or to simulationism. The only thing that can be said is that we infer why he did it from what he did, and this is not behavior.

What a player does is behavior, and evidence of why he does it.
What a player says is behavior, and evidence of why he does it.
But the very concept that a player has "goals" at all means that he is thinking, or feeling, or internally providing reason to his actions. That is, the behavior only gives us evidence that he has these goals; the pursuit of these goals, whether or not articulable, whether or not clearly understood by the agent, whether or not consistent, is the expression of something internal.

That is, when you say that a player tends to make simulationist decisions, you are saying that he tends to make decisions based on some internal drive or reason or desire to move toward simulationist goals. The very definition of simulationist goals implies some "reason" behind the decision.

You might say I am a conservative (although I recently was labeled a "liberal airhead" by one test); I tend to vote for conservative candidates. Now, you can observe that I vote for conservative candidates, and that I write in defense of certain conservative causes. These are behaviors. You might not know that concerns for oppressed minority rights have influenced me to oppose abortion, or that being near the poverty line has embittered me against social programs that are abused by the poor and unavailable to those barely above some arbitrary line--and if that's what you mean by "motives" they are generally not observable. But when you say that I tend to support conservative candidates, you are inferring from my conduct that I will take similar actions in the future; and those similar actions themselves can only be recognized by inferring something inside me. My actions tell you who I am; who I am tells you what I am likely to do. If you leave out the middle step--if you say that my past actions predict my future actions--you have limited the usefulness drastically.

That is, if I killed baby kobolds before, you can predict that I am likely to do so again. If I also killed baby orcs, you might be able to predict that I would kill baby gnolls. If I claimed it was because my character does not believe such creatures are redeemable, you can predict that I would claim that in the future. But you cannot claim that I am gamist, or narrativist, or simulationist without generalizing from the specific to the general, and that requires inferring that there is some overarching principle behind these actions, some internal something that causes me to take actions that are related to each other, not in such obvious and limited ways as expressed here, but in some broader way.

Let's do it this way.

--My character kills a room full of baby kobolds, and I say it's because of the experience points.
--My character steals a valuable piece of jewelry from the home of a nobleman he is visiting.
--I shout, "all right" when my character manages to get across a narrow slippery bridge to escape pursuit.
--I blow on the dice before I roll them, and say, "Come on, twenty!"
--My character flees from a dragon, leaving his long-time companions behind to face an unwinnable fight.

What is it that ties all these behaviors together in such a way that they will all be considered Gamist?

If you tell me that it is because they all demonstrate my desire to win, you have admitted that gamism, at least, is defined by the motivation of the player: motivated by a desire to succeed or win or beat the game.

The only other thing you can tell me is that through observation over time you have recognized that these behaviors tend to occur together, that is, that people who exhibit one of them tend to exhibit the others to some degree. But in that case, there is no meaning behind them except as collections of behaviors. They are, if you will, all "syndromes"--collections of symptoms occuring together with no identified cause. They are less than syndromes, because the tendency for them to occur together is itself a generalization. Ralph might not kill baby kobolds for experience points, although he always blows on his dice and gets excited by successes and steals from wealthy nobility--and he would never abandon his comrades to face their doom without him. Damion might easily kill baby kobolds and steal from noblemen and leave his companions to face the dragon, but he doesn't make such exclamations or blow on his dice. The model would seem to lose all relevance to game design or play, because all it tells us is "people who do this are somewhat more likely also to do that than are people who don't do this", like some marketing survey telling us that those who drink Coke will probably buy junk food and pop music. If GNS is nothing more than marketing theory, it is a lot less than most of us ever supposed.

Now, maybe you don't want to call that "motive"; but if "why" a player chooses as he does is at all relevant to the matter, it is more than merely behavior.

I'm sorry to push the issue like this, but I am very dissatisfied by the notion that the "why" behind the decisions is irrelevant to the model. The model itself seems to be an effort to generalize the "why" of player actions.

--M. J. Young

[contracycle]

a distinction between what he did and why he did it.

On what basis do you make this claim?  Apart form subjective experience, can you cite any research which attributes an ontologically independant existance to an entity called "motive"?

What he did is behavior; it is observable. Why he did it is not behavior; it cannot be observed, but can only be inferred from evidence.

Correct.  That is why motive cannot play any part in a usable model.  Only observation of BEHAVOIUR can provide date, FROM WHICH we can infer motive (unreliably).

The only other thing you can tell me is that through observation over time you have recognized that these behaviors tend to occur together, that is, that people who exhibit one of them tend to exhibit the others to some degree.

Yes.  Thats a nice, safe, limited assesment of the avilable data, from which can safely procede to make opiniated speculations.

But in that case, there is no meaning behind them except as collections of behaviors.

Question: WHY shoudl there be meaning?  What do you mean by meaning?  And why is it not valid or useful to address tham AS behaviours?

They are, if you will, all "syndromes"--collections of symptoms occuring together with no identified cause.

Yes

Damion might easily kill baby kobolds and steal from noblemen and leave his companions to face the dragon, but he doesn't make such exclamations or blow on his dice. The model would seem to lose all relevance to game design or play, because all it tells us is "people who do this are somewhat more likely also to do that than are people who don't do this", like some marketing survey telling us that those who drink Coke will probably buy junk food and pop music. If GNS is nothing more than marketing theory, it is a lot less than most of us ever supposed.

I'm sorry but this is rubbish.  The fact thatbthe model is NOT presecriptive, does NOT attempt to described something that is essentially invisible to us, and is not so arrogant as to presume it could identify other peoples thought processes based on nothing but navel gazing... these are its STRENGTHS.

I'm sorry to push the issue like this, but I am very dissatisfied by the notion that the "why" behind the decisions is irrelevant to the model. The model itself seems to be an effort to generalize the "why" of player actions.

It can quite conceivebly be USED to generalise motives as long as we do not confuse motivations with data.  That is the PURPOSE of the model, nit its METHOD.

[Valamir]

Correct.  That is why motive cannot play any part in a usable model.  Only observation of BEHAVOIUR can provide date, FROM WHICH we can infer motive (unreliably).

It can quite conceivebly be USED to generalise motives as long as we do not confuse motivations with data.  That is the PURPOSE of the model, nit its METHOD.

whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa!

Gareth.  That is EXACTLY what we've been saying for what....three pages now.

Observe the action...infer the motive.   Which is exactly what you've said twice above.

If you agree with this...what exactly have you been disagreeing with then?

[contracycle]

The claim that the model is ABOUT motive.  It is not - it is about behaviour.

Taking the model as being ABOUT motivation gives us exactly the dilema identified: we can't derive motive from behaviour becuase in order to comprehend the behaviour we need to comprehend the motive.  Motive is prior to behaviour.

Restricting the model to being about behaviour obviates that dilemma.  Hence it doesn;t matter one jot what a given gamers actual motiovations are for us to constructively address system; you can do so on the basis of the behaviour they adopt while doing so.

so frex when MJ says:

That is, when you say that a player tends to make simulationist decisions, you are saying that he tends to make decisions based on some internal drive or reason or desire to move toward simulationist goals. The very definition of simulationist goals implies some "reason" behind the decision.

... I consider this totally irrelevant and arguably misleading.

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Ralph,

Gareth and I have been rock-steady on our points throughout the thread. I think that you (and everyone else on the thread) might do well to read it over from the beginning - the phrases that you are finding reasonable now are not very much like the ones you were using back then.

A lot of people have been mis-reading me to say that GNS does not and can never involve what you are calling motives. That's not what I've been saying. I've been saying that everyone is free to infer the role of motive as they see fit, and we all can talk about sets of decision-making and so forth without muddying the waters with motive-terminology.

I strongly suggest that a re-read of this thread will reveal that this discussion is largely over. I'm not closing it - wouldn't dream of it, at this point - but if it starts goin' 'round and 'round with layered justifications of "what I meant was," then I will.

Best,
Ron

[jdagna]

A lot of people have been mis-reading me to say that GNS does not and can never involve what you are calling motives. That's not what I've been saying. I've been saying that everyone is free to infer the role of motive as they see fit, and we all can talk about sets of decision-making and so forth without muddying the waters with motive-terminology.

Ron, I am in total agreement with you here.  Decisions include not only the observable action, but whatever mental process lead the person to take the action.  If you don't want to call that a motive or an intent, OK.  Perhaps motive and intent can muddy the waters.

But you can't maintain that a decision and a behavior are the same thing.  To say "decision" is to invoke an internal process.  Rocks have behavior, but no one says "The rocks decided to start a landslide."  Even a behavioral psychologist would take exception to ascribing the word decision when talking about a behavior.

GNS can be inferred from decisions, which is the word used in the essay.  GNS cannot be inferred from behavior, except in a very indirect and innaccurate manner that renders it nearly meaningless.

If you think that we simply have a misunderstanding over the meanings of the words, let me turn to my dictionary:

Behavior:
  1. The manner in which one behaves.
  2. a. The actions or reactions of a person or animal in response to external or internal stimuli.

Although, I believe this one is the most appropriate for the discussion:
4: (psychology) the aggregate of the responses or reactions or movements made by an organism in any situation  


Decision:
  1. The passing of judgment on an issue under consideration.
  2. The act of reaching a conclusion or making up one's mind.
  3. A conclusion or judgment reached or pronounced; a verdict.

Clearly, these words cannot be interchanged.

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Justin,

Sorry, man, but the dictionary won't help. There's a whole wealth of academia which sounds a hell of a lot like this thread - i.e., confused - so turning to it won't help much either.

If you'd like to discuss what I mean by "behavior," then contact me by private email. As long as we agree on the passage of mine that you quoted, then this discussion can be over.

Best,
Ron

[Wart]

Ron:

Two questions arise:

Firstly: The original GDS rgfa threefold was all about intention and motivation. Isn't it unusual to take that and make a model independent of intent and motive?

Secondly: The GNS model is about increasing one's fun. This is an internal state...

I think the problem is that half the people in this discussion are looking at wants/motives/intents, and half are looking at practise.

For example, I could have Gamist intentions, but end up playing in a Simulationist game. I'm unlikely to be happy, unless I also like Simulationism and recognise that I'm not going to get Gamist enjoyment out of this particular game. When intent and practise match, we tend to enjoy ourselves because we're getting what we want.

The GNS model as worked out by yourself, Ron, works well for looking at practise - probably reflecting your "hard" science background. Perhaps if someone from a more soft science (psychology being the obvious example) collaborated with you on the model it could cover both?

[Ron Edwards]

Arthur,

As I've stated several times, the very words "intent" and "motive" are not defined well enough across their users to be helpful. Using these words will introduce a great deal of fuzziness into the discussion, because of their incredibly wide range of meanings.

You're mis-reading me to say that things these words may denote are necessarily excluded from the model. Instead, as I've said, many things that these words are used for (sometimes) are part of the model, as encapsulated in the words "decisions" and "goals."

It seems as though people are very uncomfortable with the freedom I'm suggesting they employ. Arthur, whatever and however it is that you see "intent" or "goal" involved in the GNS model, go right ahead and see it that way - do not read my statements as excluding that perception on your part.

Best,
Ron

[Wart]

It seems as though people are very uncomfortable with the freedom I'm suggesting they employ. Arthur, whatever and however it is that you see "intent" or "goal" involved in the GNS model, go right ahead and see it that way - do not read my statements as excluding that perception on your part.

Thanks for answering one of my questions, do you have anything to say on the other one? Or my suggestion about bringing more than one person in on the maintainance/writing of the Forge "manifestos"?

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Arthur,

I don't know which of your questions you're asking about. Could you state it in full, please?

Best,
Ron

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Arthur,

I don't know which of your questions you're asking about. Could you state it in full, please?

Also, regarding bringing others into the essay or argument, that's what this whole forum is. Since the essay is specifically my interpretation, it's not a "Forge manifesto" except insofar as people agree with it. I use this forum as a kind of shared brain to continue modifying or clarifying my ideas.

Finally, sometimes folks are a little too free in ascribing this-or-that argumentative standard to the "Ron's a scientist" box. Y'all might want to hold off on that kind of reasoning.

Best,
Ron

[Wart]

I don't know which of your questions you're asking about. Could you state it in full, please?

Given that:

- Fun is a subjective thing, and someone's definition of what a fun game is varies from person to person.

- The point of the GNS model is to increase the fun people get out of the roleplaying hobby.

- The GNS model currently provides a vocabulary for describing what happens in a game.

- What happens in a game and what people want out of a game all too often diverge.

Is it not the case that it would aid the goals of the GNS model if a vocabulary for describing what people want out of a game (ie, their intent when they sit down and play) was added?

Intent and motive are all internal things, and only really come out in discussion. Currently, the GNS model provides a vocabulary for describing what is happening in-game, which makes such discussions easier, but a vocabulary for one's intentions and preferences and what one finds fun would make such discussions even easier.

[Ron Edwards]

Hi Arthur,

Such a terminology might be useful to someone. I suspect trying it at the group level would largely generate a thread much like this one - interminable and circular agonizing over what motives are.

In order to be valid, it would have to leave Gamism, Simulationism, and Narrativism out of the term-structure, such that these things were results, not causes. Similarly, the terms and associated concepts which are identified with GNS priorities (respectively, competition, Premise/Theme, and Exploration) would have to be left out.

It would also have to leave "fun," "enjoyment," and "socializing" out of the terms structure, as those are the universals.

Best,
Ron