Tactical sophistication of knightly armies

[Drifter Bob]

I don't know if this is a better idea or not, but here goes.


I was asked to cite examples of knightly European armies making serious, basic strategic blunders dealing with supply and intelligence, and of falling for the oldest trick in the horse-archers book, the feigned retreat.  Here are three classic examples:

Battle of Hattin 1187
An army of 20,000 Crusaders (but only about 10% elite heavy cavalry (knights)) attempted to raise the seige of Tiberius.   Saladin faced them with 12,000 medium cavalry, well equipped and provisioned.  The knights on the other hand marched through the desert with inadequate provisions and almost no water.  Saladin blocked streams and burnt fields, exacserbating their thirst.  They were surrounded and annihilated due to their poor supply and poor terrain knowelge.

1241 AD, Battle of Liegnitz; Mongols defeat army of Poles and Germans
including Hospitallers, Templars, and Teutonic Knights.  The defeat, though not complete, occured when roughly 1/3 of the Polish / Teutonic army broke discipline and charged the Mongols, falling for a feigned retreat.  They disappeared behind a Mongol smoke screen and were annihilated.

1241 AD Battle of Mohi, (Hungary) Mongols defeat another mixed European force, by using a variation on the fiegned retreat, the feigned escape route.  Mongols surround Kngihtly army on three sides, leaving an apparent exit route open.  After being harassed by mongol archers a few knights, then a few more, and finally a flood break discipline and attempt to flee through the apparent escape corridor, which turns out of course to be a trap.  Only a small group of Knights Templar stood their ground.  Knightly force is annihilated.

You can read a good description of the battle here:
http://home-4.worldonline.nl/~t543201/web-mongol/mongol-mohi.htm

(it is interesting to note that the Mongols suffered severe casualties in both battles, something often overlooked by historians.  Large numbers of them were mowed down by heavy crossbow fire at Liegnitz and an almost decisive number were slaughtered in melee combat when they first tried to force the Bridge at Mohi)

[contracycle]

IIRC at Hattin they also separated their cavalry and infantry, and ended up fighting two battles in effect in which neither arm could protect the other.

[A.Neill]

Just another note about Hattin - if I remember the history lessons correctly. The army of king Guy didn't fight a bad tactical battle - it was the decision to fight at all that was wrong.

They could have just let Tiberias endure the siege and let Saladin's army break up for the winter - but the Templar Commander antagonised the king into fighting.

Saladin was tactically astute however - lighting bushes, denying water etc. When Raymound of Tripoli's knights tried to charge the blokade - the Saracen horses just opened their ranks and let the knights charge through - then reformed to continue the blokade of the king.

So it was the impetuousness of the knightly classes that landed the crusader army in hot water. I think this impetuousness amoung the knightly class contributed to many a disaster on the medieval battle field (Agincourt, Peter the Hermit's Crusade, Saint Louis Crusade etc).

Alan

[Ian.Plumb]

Hi,

I think this impetuousness amoung the knightly class contributed to many a disaster on the medieval battle field (Agincourt, Peter the Hermit's Crusade, Saint Louis Crusade etc).

IMO you shouldn't put Agincourt in the list of Knightly Tactical Disasters. Nor Poitiers for that matter. Sure, the French lost both battles but that doesn't necessarily indicate that their tactics were clearly in error. For that to be the case there would need to have been an obvious tactical alternative.

Cheers,

Ian P.

[Drifter Bob]

Hi,

I think this impetuousness amoung the knightly class contributed to many a disaster on the medieval battle field (Agincourt, Peter the Hermit's Crusade, Saint Louis Crusade etc).

IMO you shouldn't put Agincourt in the list of Knightly Tactical Disasters. Nor Poitiers for that matter. Sure, the French lost both battles but that doesn't necessarily indicate that their tactics were clearly in error. For that to be the case there would need to have been an obvious tactical alternative.

Cheers,

Ian P.

I think not engaging the English on their own chosen conditions would have been a preferred option.  The fact that they attacked when they did at Agincourt, piecmeal, through mud, uphill etc., is indicative of both bad tactics, and also of them acting according to the strategic limittions of the knightly army, they tried to attack when they could (bad tactical situation or not) before the relatively undisciplined knights left the army and went their own ways...

JR

[toli]

I think not engaging the English on their own chosen conditions would have been a preferred option.  The fact that they attacked when they did at Agincourt, piecmeal, through mud, uphill etc., is indicative of both bad tactics, and also of them acting according to the strategic limittions of the knightly army, they tried to attack when they could (bad tactical situation or not) before the relatively undisciplined knights left the army and went their own ways...

JR

I would certainly agree here.

DB, I looked up Crak de Chevaliers.  It was taken in 1247 (if I remember).  The outer walls were breached (as I previously noted on the other thread) and then the RUMOR was that the Hospitalers were tricked by a false letter into surrendering the castle.  So we are basically in agreement on that one.

[Drifter Bob]

Yeah, it's a damn shame.  That castle is just too cool to have fallen.  If it had been properly garrisoned and equipped (as with counter-siege engines) I don't think they ever could have taken it, I saw a documentary on that amazing fortress and it was unbelievable how large the grain magazines were inside the place, plus catch-mates for rainwater and (I believe) an internal water source that couldn't be poisoned from outside.  All the defenses and walls were so cleverly made, almost like the Renaissance artillery towers hundreds of years later...

From what I read the Templars pilgrim castle on the coast of Palestine was even more formidable, with the added advantage that its semi-offshore position made it impossible to use sappers to min underneath the walls (one of Baibars favorite strategies.)  The castle was abandoned though I believe and alas, no longer exists intact.

JR

[contracycle]

Its not particularly run down by comparison to many.  Low incidence of rain erosion probably helps.  Some decent pics of Krak are here: http://www.homsonline.com/Citeis/KrakDesChevaliersPhotoGallery.htm  It still looks pretty mighty in the aeiral and 2from neighbouring hill" views.

[Drifter Bob]

Its not particularly run down by comparison to many.  Low incidence of rain erosion probably helps.  Some decent pics of Krak are here: http://www.homsonline.com/Citeis/KrakDesChevaliersPhotoGallery.htm  It still looks pretty mighty in the aeiral and 2from neighbouring hill" views.

I was saying that Castle Pilgrim was run down.  Krak is in excellent condition.  I had posted another link to a similar though larger photo in the Samurai thread.

JR

[Ian.Plumb]

Hi,

I think this impetuousness amoung the knightly class contributed to many a disaster on the medieval battle field (Agincourt, Peter the Hermit's Crusade, Saint Louis Crusade etc).

IMO you shouldn't put Agincourt in the list of Knightly Tactical Disasters. Nor Poitiers for that matter. Sure, the French lost both battles but that doesn't necessarily indicate that their tactics were clearly in error. For that to be the case there would need to have been an obvious tactical alternative.

I think not engaging the English on their own chosen conditions would have been a preferred option.  The fact that they attacked when they did at Agincourt, piecmeal, through mud, uphill etc., is indicative of both bad tactics, and also of them acting according to the strategic limittions of the knightly army, they tried to attack when they could (bad tactical situation or not) before the relatively undisciplined knights left the army and went their own ways...

Let's have a look at this.

Roughly 10,000 troops set out with Henry from England and commenced the siege of Harfleur. 5 weeks later Harfleur falls but dyssentry has ripped through his troops. Around 2,500 troops have either died or returned to England. Approximately 900 men-at-arms and 1,200 archers are needed to garrison Harfleur. That leaves Henry with around 5,500 or 6,000 troops, about 1,000 of which are men-at-arms and the remainder archers.

What could Henry hope to achieve with an army of this size? While stating that he hoped to meet the French army in battle he left his canon at Harfleur and instructed each man to carry rations for 8 days. This suggests that the objective was to get to Calais as quickly and directly as possible and without meeting the bulk of the French army. Why risk personal capture and the annihilation of his army on a chevauchée to Calais? Politics.

Marshall Boucicaut and Constable d'Albret seemed to know of the English plan just before the English marched out of Harfleur. Their efforts were directed towards preventing the English passage across the River Somme. Boucicaut was successful in this at the ford at Blanche Taque and the English were forced to turn inland. By the time the English managed to cross the Somme their rations were gone, they were forced to forage, and they were fifty or sixty miles inland. By the time they reached Agincourt they'd marched around 260 miles in 17 days (with one day of rest) and been foraging for half that time.

Blocking the Calais road was the French army. Roughly four times the size of the English army, well rested and provisioned, safe in the knowledge that victory was inevitable. While the French army was hastily raised in response to the English invasion 8 weeks had now passed since the English first set foot in Normandy. While the political situation ensured that Burgundy refused the call to arms, as well as the French could have responded under the circumstances they did.

That though is all about strategy. What of the battle itself and the tactics used?

Lets look at each of the points you've raised:

I think not engaging the English on their own chosen conditions would have been a preferred option.

They didn't. The French chose the ground. The English imperative was to reach Calais before they starved and the French blocked their retreat. So why did the French chose the field near Agincourt? Let's look at the battlefield analysis of one military analyst:

(The battlefield) is easily described for it is beautifully symmetrical. If the two contestants really desired a field that would give no advantage to either side as they declared, they certainly found it at Agincourt...

The fact that they attacked when they did at Agincourt, piecmeal...

Piecemeal? Certainly the French attacked in three phases. The initial mounted assault against the English flank archers which was swiftly repulsed. Then the two lines of the French main body, the men-at-arms. Then the third line of mounted troops, which never attacked.

What was the alternative? All at once? Would that not have exacerbated the compression of the French line caused by the narrowing of the field of battle between the woods on either flank? In other words, wouldn't that have worsened the very issue that was their downfall?

... through mud...

October 25th is in the midst of the Autumn planting. What was the alternative to fighting on recently ploughed land? Mud had little to do with the outcome -- the English marched through it and attacked through it without incident.

... uphill ...

Actually downhill. There is a slight dip between the initial formation lines while the flanks fall away appreciably from the centre. As such, both commanders were able to see how their opponent was forming. While initially separated by over a thousand yards the English advanced to within extreme bowshot range. Thus they marched through the slight dip and up part of the other side. The rise though is negligible.

... and also of them acting according to the strategic limittions of the knightly army...

Do you mean strategic limitations or tactical limitations?

I guess it doesn't matter as I don't think that either is correct. The English army was a knightly army as much as the French army. The English army was certainly more disciplined but they were no less knightly.

The prelude to Agincourt was well handled by Boucicaut and d'Albret. The English were skilfully guided into a position of desperation. An 8 day politically-motivated race for Calais had become a 17 day decent into a military nightmare. On the eve before the battle Henry attempted to negotiate his way out of the situation -- Harfleur for safe passage to Calais at the least, a renunciation of the claim to the French throne at best.

Military organization is not a tactical issue though it affects the tactics that can be employed. In the 14th and early 15th century it was a social issue as much as anything else. At Agincourt the French were hampered by the lack of an efficient central command, the lack of effective archers, an expectation that there would be a negotiated settlement rather than a battle and, if anything, too many troops.

Cheers,

[A.Neill]

Krak and Krak de Chevalier shouldn't be interchanged. Krak is in modern day Jordan and was taken by siege. It was Reynald de Chatillion's headquarters. He was probably a good example of a strategically bad commander yet tactically ambitious (another impetuous knight). He's pretty much reviled by the Islamic and Christian chroniclers for breaking treaties, attacking caravans and even leading a raid on one of Mecca's ports. If I recall correctly, one of his ceasefire breaches was the cited reason for Saladin's invasion of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. He was the archetypal robber-baron and was executed after the Battle of Hattin.

I don't think Krak de Chevalier (modern day Syria) was taken by storm. The Hospitallers, knowing they were hopelessly outnumbered surrendered and were allowed to retire in peace.

In regard to Agincourt – there was a program on UK Television (War Walks) that suggested that while the French knights may have been overzealous in charging through mud and through their own infantry at the English, their battle plan wasn't particularly naïve. The program claimed the French knew how to deal with English longbows by out flanking them – it's just that the woodland and lay of the land around Agincourt did not allow for this manoeuvre.

To come back to the original question, I think that that knightly impetuousness can be cited in example after example of best laid plans going astray. Equally, in campaigns like Richard's Crusade, where he held his knights' desire to charge until (almost) the best possible moment, there were victories against the odds. This ties well into the Sarcen Faris tactic of feigning retreat only to ambush knights away from the main part of their army.

Course there will be other reasons for miltary catastrophes - but I think this is one you may not want to overlook.

Alan.

[toli]

I don't think Krak de Chevalier (modern day Syria) was taken by storm. The Hospitallers, knowing they were hopelessly outnumbered surrendered and were allowed to retire in peace.

Krak de Chavalier was sort of taken by storm.  The outer defenses were taken, and then the Hospitallers surrendered the rest and were allowed to retire in peace.  Supposedly they were tricked into surrendering by a false letter from the Hopsitaller leader, but they probably just realized that the situation was hopeless.

NT

[Drifter Bob]

I don’t think Krak de Chevalier (modern day Syria) was taken by storm. The Hospitallers, knowing they were hopelessly outnumbered surrendered and were allowed to retire in peace.

Krak de Chavalier was sort of taken by storm.  The outer defenses were taken, and then the Hospitallers surrendered the rest and were allowed to retire in peace.  Supposedly they were tricked into surrendering by a false letter from the Hopsitaller leader, but they probably just realized that the situation was hopeless.

NT

I think Krak de Chevalier had also held out a few decades previously in a siege attempt by Saladin, which added to the considerable reputation of the fort.

Regarding Raynard De Chatillion, among his many crimes he is also reknown for having tortured a septegenarian Crusader Kingdom Bishop (I forget which one) to find his stash of money, by smearing honey on his head and leaving him out all day for the bugs to feast on ...  he was a real prince among men.  

Finally, while Raynard is an example of the Impetuous knight, I think it could be pointed out that Saladin was probably the best example of Chivalry in practice, and The Mameluke Baibars of ruthless efficiency.

Baibars being one of the few folks anywhere to ever truly stomp the Mongols.

JR

JR

[toli]

Baibars being one of the few folks anywhere to ever truly stomp the Mongols.

JR

JR

Yes.  One has to respect that...

Didn't Salah-al-Din personally kill Raynard for being such a bastard or am I confusing that with some other incident?.NT

[A.Neill]

...

Didn't Salah-al-Din personally kill Raynard for being such a bastard or am I confusing that with some other incident?.

The story goes that after Saladin had at last won the day at Hattin - he let the king and other barons partake of an iced drink that he himself served. When it came to Reynald's turn - he let him take the drink himself- thereby not showing him traditional Arabian* hospitality.  Saladin then felt able to personally relieve Reynald's head from its body.

In regard to Saladin's chivalry - yes on balance he puts many of the crusader leaders to shame - but his record isn't completely unblemished. How he consolidated power in Cairo, and his mass execution of Templars and Hospitallers after Hattin detract from his record somewhat. Still, after the capture of Jerusalem - his chronicallers say that he personally paid many ransoms when the Latin Patriarch escaped with the church's not inconsiderable wealth.

In regard to the original point about tactical blunders - I don't think Saladin was a tactical genious (superior, sure)- he won and lost battles (his greatest blunder was leaving Tyre untaken - giving a rallying point for the defeated crusaders). His genious, I think,  was political - uniting Syria and Egypt under a single leadership - creating the (shortlived) Abuyite dynasty and maintaining excellent relations with the Byzantine Empire. Greater military leaders may have been Zengi or Nuredin (Saladin's liege-lord - at least nominally) whose military successes first began to turn the tide against the crusader kingdoms.

Hope that's useful!

Alan.


* Saladin was Kurdish rather than Arab in origin.