A decision does not possess a creative agenda. Rather the consequences of a decision evidence a dynamic which retro-actively places the decision within a creative agenda. This dynamic structure is reminiscent to the quantum mechanical problem of meaurement. In this case there appears to be an uncertainty between the two main factors of a given consequence. Namely, the origin of the consequence (i.e. the decision) and the classification of the consequence (i.e. the creative agenda). The less locally we look, the simpler it is to discriminate creative agendas. The more loose we are with creative agendas, the closer the decisions of play can be analyzed.

This principle is an attempt to generalize a common difficulty both proponants and opponants of GNS encounter, namely the inability to link decisions with creative agendas.

I'm interested to know if this sort of principle is viewed as necessary or unnecessary, desireable or undesireable. And whether or not it could be refined further.

Thank you for your time,

-Mendel S.

Well spoken Mendel. I think that summarizes the current thinking on nature of decisions and Creative Agenda nicely.

Perhaps we will begin linking to this thread as the Wormwood Principle :-)

I think I need further clarification on:

The less locally we look, the simpler it is to discriminate creative agendas. The more loose we are with creative agendas, the closer the decisions of play can be analyzed.

Well when one "observes" an electron one is attempting to actually obtain some set of quantifiable measurements about it...not simply watch it whiz around.

While it is possible to simply "observe" an RPG session (through a one way mirror so to speak) any attempt to actually "take a measurement", (i.e. record the findings in such a way as they can be reported to others) does immediately hit that perception bias in a big way. So I think the analogy holds, albiet for completely different reasons. Which one would expect.

It'll be no surprise that I've got some pretty definite feelings about this.

1. You can know both your own intent (yeah, that's the common term for creative agenda) behind a decision when you make it. This would violate the uncertaintiy principle (as Mike suggests). Gareth disagrees with me on that--but I maintain it's true for any level of discussion that is above the "what's consciousness *anyway,* man" level of converstion.

Another way of saying this is: "You can know what you like and what you don't like."

2. There is no 'standard deviation' calculation in GNS--so expecting a bunch of innacurate measurements to add up to one accurate one doesn't seem so right to me. I'm un-convinced that all "play at the table" will fall into a given mode. This is because ...

3. GNS is not 1-player, 1-mode. It's not even 1-game, 1-mode. It's 1-situation/decision, 1-mode. Therefore play at the table for a single person could be an even split of atomic decisions, therefore failing any actual "at the table classification"--the observer would, at best, have to say something like:

"The combat at the castle was simulationist but the play in the forrest was Gamist." But once you get down to a fine-enough gradation, you run into a level where you will, essentially, be analyzing individual decisions (or close to it, I think).

-Marco

The critical analogy to quantum mechanics is the measurement of the "electron" is what disturbs it. In order to measure the creative agenda, consequences of different decisions need to mix. As a result, the greater homogeneity of that measurement implies the distintiveness of the decision has been merged to less and less clarity.

The essentialy uncertainty I'm describing is that while it is possible to single out a decision, it will lack enough context to ascribe a creative agends. Likewise if the creative agenda is precise the decision leading up to it are lost in the complexities of the consequences of those decisions.

Like an electron, a game instance has something like a distinct decision (a time) and something like a creative agenda (and Energy), but neither one is really accesible. To gain further insight into one side, necessarilly blurs the other.

Oh, and thanks Valamir. I can provide a long German surname if that will help make the idea more palatable to some people.

I hope that helps,

Mendel S.

Marco,

1) Intent is correlated but distinct from consequences. Creative agenda is ultimately a consequence of decisions, it also influences them, but it is not the intent behind the decision. It could better be described as the intent as observed through play. Yes, you can know what you want, but it's not always so easy for me to figure it out, now is it?

2 and 3) You are also confusing single mode and creative agenda here. At no point did I mean to imply that play will converge to a single mode. In fact that's quite unlikely, even in coherent games, rather a measurement of creative agenda can be taken, i.e. the mode(s) of the game can be distinguished and described. This is a subtle, but necessary distinction.

I hope that helps,

-Mendel S.

This is basically Ron's argument about the Instance of Play thing, then.

To restate: Basically, if we look at a table, we can guess that it will support a glass placed upon it. Not because it must, but because looking at enough electrons, they tend to work in a generalized manner (the glass could fall right through, but it would be so unlikely as to make you wait all universe long for it.)

Similarly, looking at specific decisions tends to make it less likely that we can know the priority of the decision. But looked at in terms of, say several sessions worth of decisions, we can say that play seems to be one thing or another.


This is problematic, however. For one, as Marco notes, I do think that you can know what a single decision is with accuracy, especially one's own, or the testimony of another informed participant (consider the case of a decision specifically made to support one of the modes). Further, when problems of incoherence do occur, they happen over single decisions in many, many cases. So, while an Instance might be one sort or another, the fact that an entire group are all playing in that mode for one instance doesn't do anything to garuntee coherent play.

Mike

Mandel,

Sure--creative agenda is the term for the extant behavior (and a poor one--after all when one uses the term 'agenda' one is usually (IME) talking specifically about intent or a planned but-not-yet-extant-and-therefore-not-observable operation). Whatever drives that behavior is some kind of unknowable intent (unless, as I say, it is your own intent in which case you may combine the two--and yes, you *can* be unclear about your own intent just as you may engage in projection with others--I see no reason for that to invalidate the measurement).

However--if the modes are mixed enough (i.e. if every three decisions was some mix of modes) then I think there would be no easily identifable trend without doing some discrete assignment of action-to-agenda.

To put it another way: the method of discerning a discrete agenda is not really describable--the Gamism essay describes step-on-up and competiton. It doesn't describe a bunch of observable behaviors. The Sim essay doesn't tell you what license to dream looks like from the outside--and on these forums it's really hard to narrow it down.

All but the most extreme behaviors have more than one possible mode--but I don't really see that getting cleared up in the big picture with a great degree of certainty.

-Marco

I certainly think this idea is related to instance of play, but is distinct simply because an uncertainty principle provides a varying gauge, rather than a cut-off point where things become safe. For this reason I feel that such a principle handles the dynamics much better.

Again intentions are not creative agendas. Rather the creative agenda is the percieved intentions. No amount of personal introspection provides this, unless the play dynamic is taken into account. It is precisely this dynamic which causes the uncertainty.

Also, a single decision cannot be incoherent. There can be incoherence generated over a small number of decisions, but that is clearly a gestalt phenomena. And while the presence may be occasionally recognizable with relatively few decisions, this does not mean that it is localized in terms of creative agenda. After all, a departure from a trend is only recognizable if there is a trend to recognize in the first place.

I hope that helps,

-Mendel S.

Marco,

I concur that it is often difficult to determine a central mode, or even describe an accurate creative agenda as a simple combination of modes. However, I have observed that it is possible to characterize a creative agenda distinctly enough to separate it from others of similiar modal features. Admittedly part of this is due to my alternate description of the model, which uses learned material as the description of a given creative agenda. In my experience the problem with uncertainty for mixed modes is not a failure of observation, but of vocabulary.

I hope that helps,

-Mendel S.

Yes, we've been here before. I don't think people really grasp that any and all of my theorizing has nothing to do with "how I feel when I do this," or "what I'm like so why I do this."

It really is about tangible and observable social interaction. Anything "below" that level, particularly the one-decision-one-mode issue, is completely out of my sphere of interest.

People seem to get a lot of mileage out of saying, "GNS isn't about labelling people, it's about labelling decisions." I consider this statement to be a developmental step, not valid in itself but perhaps useful in clambering out of a worse pit of misunderstanding. It only becomes accurate if you talk about sets of socially-reinforced decisions.

Best,
Ron

Also, a single decision cannot be incoherent.

Hey Ron,

I agree that you're saying what you say you're saying--however, the presence of the uncertainty principle is, I think telling: there's no physical reason (as in wave-form collapse) for it in the theory framework (unless you count just saying 'you can't know' as part of the framework)--and yet it exists anyway. I think that's an active barrier (but maybe not insurmountable) between the analysis and the practical application of the theory to anything, such as:

1. Making a game mechanic that will enforce the kind of play you're looking for, for anyone but yourself.

2. Developing a theory-based methodology for addressing mode-dysfunctions.

3. Determining things like "how much" System Does Matter (I don't expect a number--I'd suppose a grid--this type of system, this approach of player, this significant a degree)

On the other hand, at even a moderately informed 1-decision/1-mode level those things can be addressed.

Edited: and to use Mike's example--that can't really be addressed by the theory in abstract as it stands--and yet it destroyed the game. Clearly the lables apply with some degree of value-added-insight to single decisions ... I see the present take on it as walking away from the most immediate and tangible value searching for something of less value (a theory that's useful for describing a chain of play events but doesn't go much beyond that).

-Marco

Hello,

No, we're still talking about sets of decisions. Mike's example is not about a single decision; it's about how that decision relates to previous standards and enjoyment established earlier in play, by previous decisions which were presumably sequentially-reinforcing.

Mendel, you were looking for an uncertainty principle, which when it's at home means, which level of analysis is no longer fruitfully reductionist. I hope I've provided it for you.

Best,
Ron

Ron,

I think it'd be an interesting, probably useful piece of analysis if it was the first decision in a game where everyone just sat down to play and the observer had no other sets of decisions to go on.

And anyway, the terms are still intent based (he kills his mother for the gold pieces as opposed to "he kills his mother and takes her gold pieces. No other appearent motivation is presnet.") Same with the Narrativist--we see the recoil in horror--how do we know it wasn't an issue with matricide?

Sure, because there's more data you get from being there--but eventually you have to get down to "for the gold pieces" and "objects to story-direction te move takes" before it makes any sense--and then, if it is the first decision you've seen, you still have a decent chance of approaching it with the theory (or rather, might have a chance of approaching it with a similar thory).

-Marco

Ron Edwards wrote: No, we're still talking about sets of decisions. Mike's example is not about a single decision; it's about how that decision relates to previous standards and enjoyment established earlier in play, by previous decisions which were presumably sequentially-reinforcing.

On some recent thread I wrote something which was perhaps a revelation to me, and I was surprised no one else picked up the thought; but it's relevant here, so I'll try to restate it.

What matters in GNS analysis is what decisions the player makes when the player believes the decision is important.

For gamists, players will see as important decisions those which enhance his ability to win the game, and will make those in a way that favors winning. What color clothes he wears, what he says to the bartender, where he spends the night or with whom--these are not important decisions to him, and he doesn't care, and will make them without reference to his GNS preference.

For narrativists, players will see as important those decisions which address theme. What weapon or armor the character uses probably is not important to that, and will be made based on other concerns. It is only when he is addressing the theme that the player thinks the decisions important, and thus those are the decisions which reflect his GNS preference.

Simulationists see as important decisions which might upset the core consistency of the simulation. Narrativist and gamist decisions might be made when they don't matter to this, but not when they conflict.

That's why it's so difficult to test someone for GNS preference. The question isn't what would you do in some hypothetical situations I devise; the question is which hypothetical situations do you think are important to your enjoyment of the game. If I ask you want sword you would want your character to use in combat, all other things being equal, you would almost always pick the one that has the best in-game stats. If you're gamist, you do that because it enhances your ability to reach your goals. If you're a narrativist or simulationist you do so because without any additional context the answer doesn't matter, so you "might as well" take the good one by default.

--M. J. Young

M. J. Young wrote: On some recent thread I wrote something which was perhaps a revelation to me, and I was surprised no one else picked up the thought; but it's relevant here, so I'll try to restate it.

What matters in GNS analysis is what decisions the player makes when the player believes the decision is important.

--M. J. Young

Ron,

I agree this isn't a new discovery, but the purpose for the uncertainty principle is to characterize the break down that we observe in the theory. While we know that it fails if we ask too much accuracy from it, this does allow us to account and plan for this failure, as well as adjust observations to gain the desired level of accuracy. As far as social reinforcement, this is part of the reasons why consequences cannot be fully distinguished in terms of decisions.


Marco,

Indeed, I do think that the uncertainty issue is part of the problem with applications of GNS, it's also I suspect at the root of several misunderstandings of the theory. However, it's my hope that with a clearer description of this uncertainty, these problems may be easier to approach.


Mike,

It seems there are a few key points which I need to clarify as it pertains to your example. First, it is possible to arrive at a short hand and delcare a specific decision to be the "primary" cause. This isn't necessarilly accurate, unless that decision is uniquely associated with the agenda. Otherwise this is shorthand for, in this context this event primarilly contributes to this agenda. But we still need that context, and that means we need other decisions to frame the one we have selected. As consequences cease being determinable, this causes the uncertainty in actual cause (rather than apparent ones). Second, there were clearly numerous instances when the two players made decisions in the context of the game which served to distinguish their agendas, after all you refer to a fight. Such a conflict is necessarilly part of the meta-game, and serves to affix both players into a stronger sense of their agendas. After all, they didn't entirely realize the incoherence until the conflict has already erupted. Third, this incoherence has at least two decisions, first the matricide, and second the decision of the other player to object. These are both relevant to the discussion, and one cannot be considered less incoherent than the other, since incoherence is a gestault phenomena.


M.J.,

What you bring up is quite interesting, and I think it has merit, although, I am somewhat wary about the internalized elements of the idea of importance. Perhaps a more observable version could be formulated. Attention seems useful for this purpose.

In addition I think that the idea you present isn't too far from the techinal play hypothesis I presented a few months ago, namely considering mode to be the material being learned in the midst of play, and distinguishing classes of modes via the type of material. In this respect, what matters is the decisions which affect what the character is learning (rather than the unretained elements of the game). I think it's at least an interesting perspective to consider your idea from.

-Mendel S.

Mendel, when we refer to decisions, I've always been under the impression that the term refers to decisions made regarding what happens to in-game elements. That is, if I'm a player, and I say that my character crosses the street, I've made a decision regarding some element in-game. Yes it has an external impact, but I don't think that decisions that are completely external are what GNS is about. That is, I can talk all day about a player's right to play Narrativist, but until I grab Narrativist power in-game, incoherence does not occur. It wasn't the discussion that caused the problem, but the problem that caused the discussion to determine what the problem was.

If all you mean to say is that single decisions are difficult to determine by just looking at them, that's always been agreed to by everyone. But this is a far cry from the claim that I think that Ron is making which I thought said that it takes multiple in-game decisions to discover the creative agenda.

Ron?

Mike

Mike,

A fight about whether an in-game event should occur does qualify as a collection of decisions which affect the game. The fact that the fight eventually became something external is largely irrelevant. As you pointed out, it wasn't till during the fight that the actual creative agendas became apparent. And even then there was the preceding decisions to provide context. These allowed you to make the judgements you did. The simple decision to matricide simply does not contain the import you attribute it, unless you allow it's context to be considered. Remember this is a question of observables.

Also, and uncertainty principle is not the same as saying that a particular arena is uncertain, it provides a mechanism for uncertainty, and a gauge to determine it's variance as the system changes. One of the conclusions is that singular decisions are unclassifiable (in terms of creative agenda). On the other hand, it has far more utility than that fact.

I hope that helps,

-Mendel S.

I'm with Mendel.

Best,
Ron

Hi there,

Mike, it seems to me that the breakdown of play following the announcement in question is part of the picture. We're looking at an hour-plus "instance," characterized in full by "incoherent" and further (at the higher level of analysis) as "unsuccessful." I'm willing to let this discussion end on our disagreement about that.

Marco, I can't make head or tails of your points, so I guess I'm done with that.

M.J., I'm having a hard time seeing how your insight is a new thing. I mean, I'm glad you wrote it, and it makes perfect sense, and it's all good, but it also sorta seems obvious. The essence of "social interaction" is emotional commitment of some kind. The best way for me to respond is, "I agree!"

Best,
Ron

Ron Edwards wrote: Hi there,

Mike, it seems to me that the breakdown of play following the announcement in question is part of the picture. We're looking at an hour-plus "instance," characterized in full by "incoherent" and further (at the higher level of analysis) as "unsuccessful." I'm willing to let this discussion end on our disagreement about that.

Marco, I can't make head or tails of your points, so I guess I'm done with that.

M.J., I'm having a hard time seeing how your insight is a new thing. I mean, I'm glad you wrote it, and it makes perfect sense, and it's all good, but it also sorta seems obvious. The essence of "social interaction" is emotional commitment of some kind. The best way for me to respond is, "I agree!"

Best,
Ron

I started to write a response, mostly to Ron, but realized that I'm far enough from the original topic to start a new thread, so it's under GNS Analysis--Post Play.

--M. J. Young

Ron Edwards wrote:
Mike, it seems to me that the breakdown of play following the announcement in question is part of the picture. We're looking at an hour-plus "instance," characterized in full by "incoherent" and further (at the higher level of analysis) as "unsuccessful."

Hi Mike,

It's a good question, and I stand with you in musing over it, rather than being all sure.

At this point, and possibly as a source of frustration to you (although I hope not), it seems to me as if previous play on everyone's part, even if it wasn't with one another, is also relevant to the Instance in question, and might possibly be included within it.

Marco, what you're seeing isn't a "weak point" unless you're ascribing purposes to the theory that it doesn't have.

Best,
Ron

Ron Edwards wrote: Hi Mike,

It's a good question, and I stand with you in musing over it, rather than being all sure.

At this point, and possibly as a source of frustration to you (although I hope not), it seems to me as if previous play on everyone's part, even if it wasn't with one another, is also relevant to the Instance in question, and might possibly be included within it.

Marco, what you're seeing isn't a "weak point" unless you're ascribing purposes to the theory that it doesn't have.

Best,
Ron

Ron Edwards wrote:
At this point, and possibly as a source of frustration to you (although I hope not), it seems to me as if previous play on everyone's part, even if it wasn't with one another, is also relevant to the Instance in question, and might possibly be included within it.

Hi,

Thanks, Mike. Our last few posts puts our outlooks (regarding "instances") much closer than they seem to have been for a while, I think.

Marco, there you go - Mike's example provides an example of the kind of problems in play that may be identified and addressed through the theory. By literally using the theory, in terms of terminology and so forth, in dialogue with the other people? Probably not. But with the theory to inform one's dialogue, in keeping with trying to establish more satisfactory play (or avoiding beating out one's brains in trying), yes.

That's the added value. Whatever other added value you may or may not be looking for, I can't speak to.

Best,
Ron