The Basis for Criticism

[Roger]

(split from Musings on mechanics and The Dream)

Again and again, people object that what I'm describing can't be what they do because the essay text doesn't feel like what happens during play

I'm not entirely sure I understand what Ron is trying to say here.

As far as I can tell, "the essay text doesn't feel like what happens during play" is the only legitimate basis for criticism of game theory.

I'd be happy to hear some clarification on this.



Cheers,
Roger

[clehrich]

My understanding is that Ron is making a fairly classic distinction between how gaming works and how you, the player, think it works.

To draw a famous example from anthropology, consider a taboo against using an expectant mother's or father's own name, as opposed to calling her "Mother of Baby-Flower" and him "Father of Baby-Flower."

On the one hand, you have what used to be called the "reasons" for the taboo: "If we call them by their names, the baby or they will get sick."

On the other hand, you have what used to be called the "social function" of the taboo: by calling the woman "Mother of Baby-Flower" and the father "Father of Baby-Flower," the society affirms that this new addition is part of an established family, and is part of established nuclear-familial relations, which is to say the baby, when it arrives, is part of the community and has a place therein; this affirms and strengthens kinship bonds throughout the community, because everyone is now a participant in this birth, not just the parents (and mostly the mother).

My impression is that Ron is saying that players are usually fairly good at describing the "reasons" for their gaming behaviors, but that, as Radcliffe-Brown put it, "it is to fall into grievous error to suppose" that gamers are necessarily even aware of the "social functions" of their gaming behaviors.

Ron's model more or less claims to describe gaming behavior, choice, and so forth as it actually is, from one type of perspective.  That is not the same as saying that it accurately describes how any particular gaming group understands itself to behave.

Thus you can have gaming that the group says is X, and Ron's model says is Y, and both are accurate.  The group now says, "But that means the model is wrong, because it doesn't feel like what we do."  Ron is saying, "No, we're talking about radically different perspectives on the gaming behavior."

Note that unlike functionalist anthropologists, Ron is not saying that the "reasons" are less valid than the "social functions," i.e. that the "reasons" are mere superstition while the "social functions" are what's really happening.  It's just a question of perspective.

That's my impression, anyway.

{The reference here is: Radcliffe-Brown, A.R.  Taboo.  The Frazer Lecture.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939.  Reprinted a great many times in various places, as it's not very long.}

[John Kim]

As far as I can tell, "the essay text doesn't feel like what happens during play" is the only legitimate basis for criticism of game theory.

My impression is that Ron is saying that players are usually fairly good at describing the "reasons" for their gaming behaviors, but that, as Radcliffe-Brown put it, "it is to fall into grievous error to suppose" that gamers are necessarily even aware of the "social functions" of their gaming behaviors.

Ron's model more or less claims to describe gaming behavior, choice, and so forth as it actually is, from one type of perspective.  That is not the same as saying that it accurately describes how any particular gaming group understands itself to behave.

Thus you can have gaming that the group says is X, and Ron's model says is Y, and both are accurate.  The group now says, "But that means the model is wrong, because it doesn't feel like what we do."  Ron is saying, "No, we're talking about radically different perspectives on the gaming behavior."

So is there any possible basis for criticism of Y??  From what you say, it sounds like the model is above criticism -- because claims of gamers that it doesn't match their game can be dismissed because they don't understand even their own games.  I don't think you actually mean that, but you're not offering any possibility for criticism here.  How should criticism of game theory proceed, if not from how it fits actual play?  

Personally, I think that while you can try to claim that gamers don't understand the analysis of their games, the onus must be on the theory to show that that is the case.  Threads like "how does theory X analyze my campaign Y" might be contentious, but so are arguments based on first principles.  Criticism is always going to be contentious, but if you're going to have criticism, I prefer it to have basis in Actual Play.  

Moreover, I don't think that the perspective of social function you suggest is at work here.  I can see a lot of social function analysis in, for example, Gary Fine's "Shared Worlds" book.  He talks a lot about dominance structures, for example.  However, GNS theories, as described in the essays, aren't socially analytical this way.  (Ron has some excellent posts on social function, such as the "Infamous Five" and elsewhere -- but they aren't in the current GNS essays.)  GNS is generally about the game itself.  i.e. Whether you are playing to address Premise or to commit to the Dream, this doesn't say anything about the game's social function for the real people.  

I consider social function to be mostly territory that has yet to be addressed.  As one example, some of Ron's recent posts have suggested that the core of GNS Simulationism is celebration.  I think that's an avenue that should be explored further, because it is starting to suggest a social context.  But calling it "celebration" isn't enough, because celebration has real social function to be analyzed further.  Celebrations (like birthday party, wedding feast, baby shower) are all important, transformative social functions.  For those who missed it, references:
http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?p=133952#133952
- Here is the initial explanation.
http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?p=136131#136131
- Here Ron cites his prior post, saying "That's it, people. That's what Simulationist play is."
http://www.indie-rpgs.com/viewtopic.php?t=12860&start=0
- This has some further discussion of the quote.

The celebration thing should probably be split off into it's own thread, though.  Roger's question is a meta-issue about how criticism should proceed.

[contracycle]

So is there any possible basis for criticism of Y??  From what you say, it sounds like the model is above criticism -- because claims of gamers that it doesn't match their game can be dismissed because they don't understand even their own games.  I don't think you actually mean that, but you're not offering any possibility for criticism here.  How should criticism of game theory proceed, if not from how it fits actual play?  

No, you respond exactly by citing Actual Play.  But that is, Actual Play, not play as mediated by supposed intent or whatever.  The actuality of play may be distinct from the light in which the player interpret that play.  Possibly the example of this with which we are most familiar is play which is described, and perceived by its participants, to be "by the rules" but which in fact contains ommissions or reinterpretations of some rules.

[clehrich]

My impression is that Ron is saying that players are usually fairly good at describing the "reasons" for their gaming behaviors, but that, as Radcliffe-Brown put it, "it is to fall into grievous error to suppose" that gamers are necessarily even aware of the "social functions" of their gaming behaviors.

So is there any possible basis for criticism of Y??  From what you say, it sounds like the model is above criticism -- because claims of gamers that it doesn't match their game can be dismissed because they don't understand even their own games.  I don't think you actually mean that, but you're not offering any possibility for criticism here.  How should criticism of game theory proceed, if not from how it fits actual play?

Okay, three points here.

First, the claim as I understand it emphasizes this question of "how it feels."  The point is that gamers do things, and they feel something, but that these are quite possibly different.  The Big Model claims to address what is done, not how it feels, thus to challenge the Big Model by saying, "That doesn't feel right" is to miss the target.

Second, the division I'm pointing to here isn't between "purpose" and "social function"; that's what Radcliffe-Brown and the functionalists were up to.  The Big Model has somewhat different terms and aims; I'm just saying that the division is not unlike this, and I was trying to use a concrete example to illustrate how such a division might work.

Third, as you know, I don't actually think the Big Model is entirely successful in its aims.  I think there is a constant blurring of fields.  Furthermore, the distinction drawn by the functionalists is an extremely dubious one.  It was later reformulated as "emic" and "etic" views (emic being internal and etic being external), but this too doesn't hold water, as it turns out.  So while I'm trying to explain how I think the Big Model is formulated, I don't actually think this is an especially good division to draw.

With that division firmly in place, is there ground for criticism of the model from the perspective of the player?  No, not really.  That's one of the problems of such a division.  Further, a good deal of what ought to be legitimate data -- how the players feel about their games, for instance -- is placed outside analysis.

Personally, I think that while you can try to claim that gamers don't understand the analysis of their games, the onus must be on the theory to show that that is the case.

This is relatively straightforward, though.  If the Big Model appears to describe gaming well, and it is not the model running in gamers' heads, then you've just demonstrated the case.  It depends on what is meant by "understand their games": the issue is whether gamers think about their games in the same terms as the model demonstrates their games actually to act.

Moreover, I don't think that the perspective of social function you suggest is at work here.

As I say, that's an analogy.

If, as I suspect, you're saying that this division tends to keep the model outside criticism, you're right.  But the division itself is not illogical; it's a question of being rigorous and precise about it such that the model can be criticized and analyzed from both Actual Play and first principles.

[Ron Edwards]

Well, I was going to answer the question but I think that the discussion moved elsewhere.

Roger, wanna take it to private email? We might do better there.

Best,
Ron

[clehrich]

If we're misreading you, Ron, we'd all like to know how and why.  I'd like to hear your response to Roger's question.

[Ron Edwards]

Hello,

Chris, I have no idea whether you or John are mis-reading me. What I can't seem to get over (and this is my fifth attempted reply, so that tells you I'm really gagging on this), is that Roger asked a simple question that I can answer very simply ... and y'all leaped into the gap and created an enormously complex set of points and questions instead.

It seems entirely at odds with all the points you raised in your excellent Site Discussion post. Why not just ... take a few hours to chill out? Maybe let me respond? Maybe see what someone else has to say?

Now I'm supposed to respond to Roger ... but also dissect all that stuff to your and John's satisfaction too? Moses & Mohammed eatin' beans!

I'm going to do you two some disrespect, for which I apologize in advance. I am going to completely ignore every post in this thread so far except the first. This is absolutely non-Forge behavior on my part and would ordinarily only be tolerated if you two were entirely off-topic. Bluntly, I have no idea whether you are or aren't. (And again, this whole "mis-reading" comment really gets up my nose. I'm trying to get over that, and I know that if I did try to address the stuff you and John are talking about, it would keep me from doing so effectively.)

I'm also requesting, with any luck with respect this time, that you guys leave me & Roger some space for a few posts.

Roger, here goes:

The essay isn't about how role-playing feels, and simply never includes the topic as a definitional issue. It's about what people do at a social, creative, and procedural level. The reader is expected to step back and look at himself or herself, in play with fellow players, and see whether what he or she does is like what I'm describing. Whatever the experience feels like is left up to the reader's privacy. The closest thing to it is Creative Agenda, but even that leaves most specific emotions wide open for the reader to fill in. Two people can be engaged in Step On Up together and feel very differently about, for instance, losing, even as they agree procedurally on what it actually is, during play.

Let's say we were talking about music. My essay would then be about stuff like music-to-society, or technical stuff like chords and tempo. Creative Agenda would be analogized to something like different patterns in playing music (who knows what, something anyway). It wouldn't include a damn thing about the sensations of playing music. It would definitely say something about how all sorts of sensations would or could be involved and expect the reader to fill in his or her sensations as seemed appropriate.

So a person comes to that essay with a very strong commitment to the sensations he experiences while playing music. Frustrating essay, eh? He's looking for "what he does" in the essay, and using these sensations as a yardstick. He might even encounter his exact CA in there, in social and creative terms - but hey, where're the sensations that he bloody well knows are involved? And where's the sense of validating these sensations that he was looking forward to? Not there? Well then! (1) Ron must not get it, and (2) he must not approve of it.

Back to role-playing, even if the person acknowledges that my description of a given Social Contract, a given CA, a given set of emphases on the Explored Components, and a given set of Techniques and Ephemera is dead-on for him and his fellow players, I must still be getting it wrong because the sensations aren't "there."

If you want to read the essays critically and to apply them to your own role-playing, then here's what I suggest. First, recognize that any of our actions and favored activities in life can be discussed at a level that leaves feelings out of it - not denies them, not says that they're not there, but just isn't talking about them today. We can do this with any art form, with cooking, with sex, and with work. Anything. I readily accept that feelings are involved in all of these and that we wouldn't do them without the feelings being involved. Fine - now we move on and talk about this other level.

Second, keep in mind that the core of all role-playing is a "shared imagined space," and therefore we have to focus on the sharing part - that is, after all, what all the procedures of play are actually doing, permitting us to share what we imagine as we imagine it, and not accepting it as "done" until it's shared. What I'm driving at is that it's a group activity, and therefore the real variables of interest are not internal to the single practitioner, but rather conducted (and therefore observable) among the participants. So when you reference your own experiences in thinking about the Big Model, you should be thinking about "what we did and said together, and how we responded to one another," rather than "how I felt about it at the time."

Third, all the discussions in Actual Play bring all those feelings right up front and center, after all. That's what those discussions are for, in many cases. That's where the individual experience and concrete satisfaction/dissatisfaction are put right into the spotlight. Sometimes we find out that someone does X and others do too, but for different emotional reasons. Sometimes we find out that one person gets emotional-satisfaction out of X, but another person gets the same kind of satisfaction from an entirely-different Y. I could keep going with all these "sometimes" examples because they are wonderfully diverse, and every post in Actual Play helps us all to understand where and how the emotional aspect of role-playing comes into the structural/aesthetic description provided by the Big Model.

Does any of that seem helpful, or make sense?

Let me clarify one more thing. I am not claiming that role-players do not know what they feel, or that I'm talking about what they "really" do when they think they're doing something else. This is not about denial or telling people what they are "really" doing, although those issues come into Actual Play discussions sometimes. The specifc answer to your question is a matter of clarifying what the subject for discussion is.

Best,
Ron

[Marco]

The idea that the model discusses "what was done" still eludes me since it *doesn't* discuss techniques or actions at the table but rather the social results of actions (Joe gained cred for steping on up).

The results are in the realm of "what was felt" (Joe felt validated by the others for being a gamin' stud).

If we don't think Joe felt validated for his gaming studliness then we have something other than gamist play going on.

This is exemplified in my question surrounding the Sim/Nar divide, which seems to me (presently) to be based entirely on what types of emotions were felt by the participants (under the condition that there is a premise-style question in the resolved situation).

This is mostly because I'm still not clear on how the input-validation works/looks like under GNS Sim (awatin' Ron's post).

-Marco

[jdagna]

Marco, I think you're complicating things.  It doesn't matter whether Joe felt validated, just that validation was offered for a specific kind of behavior.  It doesn't even really matter whether the person who offered validation really meant it.  It also doesn't matter why Joe stepped on up.  You could literally have a bunch of really miserable people all performing Gamist behaviors even while they all privately feel that gaming should be different.

Or, put another way... if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck... even if it doesn't think like a duck.

So, going back to Roger, the basis for criticism would have to focus on actions - do you feel that certain behaviors really belong in a different CA, or do you feel that there are relevant behaviors the current CAs don't address?  Something like that.

Personally, I think a theory/model like GNS is one that can't be "proven wrong" it could only be incrementally refined or completely replaced by something better.  Although... I'm not sure how one would define "better" in relation to something like this either.

[Marco]

Marco, I think you're complicating things.  It doesn't matter whether Joe felt validated, just that validation was offered for a specific kind of behavior.  It doesn't even really matter whether the person who offered validation really meant it.  It also doesn't matter why Joe stepped on up.  You could literally have a bunch of really miserable people all performing Gamist behaviors even while they all privately feel that gaming should be different.

I grant all of that--I'm thinking about the circumstance where I'm trying to analyze the game and I ask Joe what happened and he gives me a transcript of play where he takes on a dragon. The play is functional, Joe and others had fun.

Joe was, in essence, validated for something.

I have to ask him if he felt validated for his address of the challenge to know if it was Gamist play (given that it was functional to begin with) or if he was validated for his in-genre knight's play ... or if he was validated for his making the choice to choose weapons over mercy.

If I'm there then perhaps I can "score" the game myself but in order to do so I either have to impose my context on it (i.e. I decide that the group is validating step-on-up instead of adherence to genre when the knight goes in to the cave alone to fight the dragon) or ask Joe which it was.

I don't think unreliable self-reporting is any more common than biased analysis (assuming the guy doing the self-reporting understands the theory and therefore the question) so IMO, it's a wash.

I can tell you what I felt validated for in my games.

I can't tell you what other people were validating.

-Marco

[Ron Edwards]

OK, great comments all 'round, and I'm OK with your points, Marco. I really do think that the Sim/Narr is not about feeeeelings involved, and we can deal with that one of these decades. Thanks for the reminder on that one.

Roger! Roger!!! Can you give me some indication that you read any of this, and weigh in with what you think?

Best,
Ron

[Roger]

Yes, I've read it.  Just took me a while to digest it all.

It makes a lot of sense.  Focusing on actions and external processes rather than thoughts and internal processes seems to be a good idea.

The only thing that seems a bit incongruous with that is that it seems to me that Creative Agendas are fundamentally defined purely in terms of internal processes.


Cheers,
Roger

[Ron Edwards]

Hello,

That's Marco's big point about Narrativism vs. Simulationism, or perhaps about Creative Agenda as a whole.

I disagree with this point, although not perhaps in the way that is ascribed to me. I suggest that any Creative Agenda can be reliably or at least defensibly inferred through experiencing play with the people involved (i.e. being one of them), or from watching them, and with appropriate questioning, through interviewing.

However, I do readily concede that all such inferences might be incorrect in any particular instance. That applies to "inference" as a concept and is accepted by any practitioner of empirical analysis from the beginning.

Roger, my concern with your statement is your use of the term "purely." Take a look at these three things:

Story Now requires Premise, which is to say an imaginary situation which throws a real-world problematic issue up for judgmental grabs.

Step On Up requires Challenge, which is to say an imaginary situation which puts real-world strategy and guts on the line.

The Right to Dream requires, h'm, we need a term, how about "Focus?" Maybe "Topic"? Which would mean which elements of the to-be-Explored material are going to be used as foundational, and as the topic for celebratory play. So ... an imaginary situation which permits us to elaborate upon and celebrate the baseline features of the topic.

In my view, all of them are discernable upon seeing all of the System in action, eventually. I consider the two fundamental features of System to be:

IIEE
Reward

They both operate all along the scale from moment-to-moment to many-session, depending on the game and group, which is why "instance of play" has always been left a little open, but also considered to be at least a full session and probably more.

So you must consider a real-live, operational role-playing group engaged in "what they do," using the IIEE and Reward procedures in the usual fun-or-not and feedback-into-more-play fashion we associate with this hobby.

I think that discerning any of the following among that group is pretty easy, given that you and I are both humans and understand the "language" of social rewards:

1. One of those CAs described above in action most of the time

2. Some functional combination of them (I think this is rarer than most would like to think, but am willing to split the difference)

3. A rather crazy-quilt effect of multiple CAs, usually associated with not much happening in-game, as well as with some repetitive disputes over how to conduct those fundamental features of System

4. A muted and (to many eyes) rather boring focus on the imagined material, with only occasional and perhaps even hidden satisfactory moments relative to one or more CAs

5. Plain old confusion about what the hell is going on, with sporadic and sometimes bizarre attempts to satisfy one or more CAs

6. All-out war over what CA is to be satisfied, or about how to do it for one or more CAs

7. No CA or even SIS to speak of (this is sadly more common than I would like, leading me to distinguish "gaming" from "role-playing" - in my view, many gamers are not role-playing no matter how many dice they roll or characters they make up or how many hours they sit around together)

I'd like to point out that the above construction of possible observation completely removes dysfunctional play from Simulationism. I specifically want Mike Holmes to acknowledge that I am treating Simulationist play as a fun and distinctive mode/CA of its very own.

So, back to your "purely," Roger. Given that CA plays a unique role in "nailing the Big Model together," it certainly is constructed of participants' desires, motives, intentions, and all those similar words. But for purposes of recognizing and discussing it, I do not turn to telepathy or to gut-responses or "know it when I see it" thinking. (These have all been accusations leveled at me in the past.) I look to the interactions and social reinforcements among the real people as they conduct System.

The real fuel for role-playing is social. Look for social reward systems (the biggest possible "thing" in role-playing, perhaps even best considered the head or cap of the Creative Agenda nail), and you will see CAs in action.

Best,
Ron

[Marco]

Hello,

That's Marco's big point about Narrativism vs. Simulationism, or perhaps about Creative Agenda as a whole.

I disagree with this point, although not perhaps in the way that is ascribed to me. I suggest that any Creative Agenda can be reliably or at least defensibly inferred through experiencing play with the people involved (i.e. being one of them), or from watching them, and with appropriate questioning, through interviewing.

Just sos I can be clear: my observation (presently) is that under what I consider to be common conditions in many games, the definitive difference between Sim and Nar has to do with the participants feeling empathic emotions based on in-game situation.

I certainly think that the presence of those emotions will be observable (most of the time--and if not to outside obsevers, certainly to the guy experiencing the emotion).

As I've said, this concept (for me) is still in orbit pending an in-depth discussion of what I'm calling the Sim gating-factor. But just because I think the difference is split on the basis of an internal factor doesn't mean I don't think it's observable.

The upshot of my conclusions is that any kind of distinct focus on premise or discussion of point/model is obscuring what I think is the primary issue for what is described as Narrativist play.

I don't think that what I'm proposing is in disagreement with some/all of The Model. I just think that some of the twistier points of discussion of defition could be dispensed with and a lot of the CA/Theme confusion could be gotten rid of (again, maybe--I'm willing to accept that I could be wrong about this but I don't think it's been hashed out yet, fully).

-Marco
[ There's also a strong importance on stuff like players not being railroaded and decisions being made referant to the emotions being felt--but, again, what I'm talking about is a standard case scenario for many games, not so much edge conditions. ]