In Search of an Uncertainty Principle

[Wormwood]

A decision does not possess a creative agenda. Rather the consequences of a decision evidence a dynamic which retro-actively places the decision within a creative agenda. This dynamic structure is reminiscent to the quantum mechanical problem of meaurement. In this case there appears to be an uncertainty between the two main factors of a given consequence. Namely, the origin of the consequence (i.e. the decision) and the classification of the consequence (i.e. the creative agenda). The less locally we look, the simpler it is to discriminate creative agendas. The more loose we are with creative agendas, the closer the decisions of play can be analyzed.

This principle is an attempt to generalize a common difficulty both proponants and opponants of GNS encounter, namely the inability to link decisions with creative agendas.

I'm interested to know if this sort of principle is viewed as necessary or unnecessary, desireable or undesireable. And whether or not it could be refined further.

Thank you for your time,

  -Mendel S.

[Valamir]

Well spoken Mendel.  I think that summarizes the current thinking on nature of decisions and Creative Agenda nicely.

Perhaps we will begin linking to this thread as the Wormwood Principle :-)

[Mike Holmes]

I think I need further clarification on:

The less locally we look, the simpler it is to discriminate creative agendas. The more loose we are with creative agendas, the closer the decisions of play can be analyzed.

I mean, we seem to be making an analogy to electrons. In order for it to be true, the actions mentioned must make sense in this context. The problem is, that I think that one can observe an RPG decision without disturbing it (something not possible with electrons). Or does this relate to the cultural perception of bias?

Mike

[Valamir]

Well when one "observes" an electron one is attempting to actually obtain some set of quantifiable measurements about it...not simply watch it whiz around.

While it is possible to simply "observe" an RPG session (through a one way mirror so to speak) any attempt to actually "take a measurement", (i.e. record the findings in such a way as they can be reported to others) does immediately hit that perception bias in a big way.  So I think the analogy holds, albiet for completely different reasons.  Which one would expect.

[Marco]

It'll be no surprise that I've got some pretty definite feelings about this.

1. You can know both your own intent (yeah, that's the common term for creative agenda) behind a decision when you make it. This would violate the uncertaintiy principle (as Mike suggests). Gareth disagrees with me on that--but I maintain it's true for any level of discussion that is above the "what's consciousness *anyway,* man" level of converstion.

Another way of saying this is: "You can know what you like and what you don't like."

2. There is no 'standard deviation' calculation in GNS--so expecting a bunch of innacurate measurements to add up to one accurate one doesn't seem so right to me. I'm un-convinced that all "play at the table" will fall into a given mode. This is because ...

3. GNS is not 1-player, 1-mode. It's not even 1-game, 1-mode. It's 1-situation/decision, 1-mode. Therefore play at the table for a single person could be an even split of atomic decisions, therefore failing any actual "at the table classification"--the observer would, at best, have to say something like:

"The combat at the castle was simulationist but the play in the forrest was Gamist." But once you get down to a fine-enough gradation, you run into a level where you will, essentially, be analyzing individual decisions (or close to it, I think).

-Marco

[Wormwood]

The critical analogy to quantum mechanics is the measurement of the "electron" is what disturbs it. In order to measure the creative agenda, consequences of different decisions need to mix. As a result, the greater homogeneity of that measurement implies the distintiveness of the decision has been merged to less and less clarity.

The essentialy uncertainty I'm describing is that while it is possible to single out a decision, it will lack enough context to ascribe a creative agends. Likewise if the creative agenda is precise the decision leading up to it are lost in the complexities of the consequences of those decisions.

Like an electron, a game instance has something like a distinct decision (a time) and something like a creative agenda (and Energy), but neither one is really accesible. To gain further insight into one side, necessarilly blurs the other.

Oh, and thanks Valamir. I can provide a long German surname if that will help make the idea more palatable to some people.

I hope that helps,

   Mendel S.

[Wormwood]

Marco,

1) Intent is correlated but distinct from consequences. Creative agenda is ultimately a consequence of decisions, it also influences them, but it is not the intent behind the decision. It could better be described as the intent as observed through play. Yes, you can know what you want, but it's not always so easy for me to figure it out, now is it?

2 and 3) You are also confusing single mode and creative agenda here. At no point did I mean to imply that play will converge to a single mode. In fact that's quite unlikely, even in coherent games, rather a measurement of creative agenda can be taken, i.e. the mode(s) of the game can be distinguished and described. This is a subtle, but necessary distinction.

I hope that helps,

 -Mendel S.

[Mike Holmes]

This is basically Ron's argument about the Instance of Play thing, then.

To restate: Basically, if we look at a table, we can guess that it will support a glass placed upon it. Not because it must, but because looking at enough electrons, they tend to work in a generalized manner (the glass could fall right through, but it would be so unlikely as to make you wait all universe long for it.)

Similarly, looking at specific decisions tends to make it less likely that we can know the priority of the decision. But looked at in terms of, say several sessions worth of decisions, we can say that play seems to be one thing or another.


This is problematic, however. For one, as Marco notes, I do think that you can know what a single decision is with accuracy, especially one's own, or the testimony of another informed participant (consider the case of a decision specifically made to support one of the modes). Further, when problems of incoherence do occur, they happen over single decisions in many, many cases. So, while an Instance might be one sort or another, the fact that an entire group are all playing in that mode for one instance doesn't do anything to garuntee coherent play.

Mike

[Marco]

Mandel,

Sure--creative agenda is the term for the extant behavior (and a poor one--after all when one uses the term 'agenda' one is usually (IME) talking specifically about intent or a planned but-not-yet-extant-and-therefore-not-observable operation). Whatever drives that behavior is some kind of unknowable intent (unless, as I say, it is your own intent in which case you may combine the two--and yes, you *can* be unclear about your own intent just as you may engage in projection with others--I see no reason for that to invalidate the measurement).

However--if the modes are mixed enough (i.e. if every three decisions was some mix of modes) then I think there would be no easily identifable trend without doing some discrete assignment of action-to-agenda.

To put it another way: the method of discerning a discrete agenda is not really describable--the Gamism essay describes step-on-up and competiton. It doesn't describe a bunch of observable behaviors. The Sim essay doesn't tell you what license to dream looks like from the outside--and on these forums it's really hard to narrow it down.

All but the most extreme behaviors have more than one possible mode--but I don't really see that getting cleared up in the big picture with a great degree of certainty.

-Marco

[Wormwood]

I certainly think this idea is related to instance of play, but is distinct simply because an uncertainty principle provides a varying gauge, rather than a cut-off point where things become safe. For this reason I feel that such a principle handles the dynamics much better.

Again intentions are not creative agendas. Rather the creative agenda is the percieved intentions. No amount of personal introspection provides this, unless the play dynamic is taken into account. It is precisely this dynamic which causes the uncertainty.

Also, a single decision cannot be incoherent. There can be incoherence generated over a small number of decisions, but that is clearly a gestalt phenomena. And while the presence may be occasionally recognizable with relatively few decisions, this does not mean that it is localized in terms of creative agenda. After all, a departure from a trend is only recognizable if there is a trend to recognize in the first place.

I hope that helps,

   -Mendel S.

[Wormwood]

Marco,

I concur that it is often difficult to determine a central mode, or even describe an accurate creative agenda as a simple combination of modes. However, I have observed that it is possible to characterize a creative agenda distinctly enough to separate it from others of similiar modal features. Admittedly part of this is due to my alternate description of the model, which uses learned material as the description of a given creative agenda. In my experience the problem with uncertainty for mixed modes is not a failure of observation, but of vocabulary.

I hope that helps,

  -Mendel S.

[Ron Edwards]

Yes, we've been here before. I don't think people really grasp that any and all of my theorizing has nothing to do with "how I feel when I do this," or "what I'm like so why I do this."

It really is about tangible and observable social interaction. Anything "below" that level, particularly the one-decision-one-mode issue, is completely out of my sphere of interest.

People seem to get a lot of mileage out of saying, "GNS isn't about labelling people, it's about labelling decisions." I consider this statement to be a developmental step, not valid in itself but perhaps useful in clambering out of a worse pit of misunderstanding. It only becomes accurate if you talk about sets of socially-reinforced decisions.

Best,
Ron

[Mike Holmes]

Also, a single decision cannot be incoherent.

To illustrate what I'm talking about, player A makes some very Gamist decision (uh, to choose an intentionally overstated case, he kills his mother for her gold pieces). Player B, a Narrativist, recoils in horror, because the player is obviously voiding any sense of internal consistency, or dramatic purpose.

That's what I'm talking about when I speak of Incoherence occuring on the level of individual decisions. Modes coming into conflict over single decisions. I've had entire games collapse because of this.

Mike

[Marco]

Hey Ron,

I agree that you're saying what you say you're saying--however, the presence of the uncertainty principle is, I think telling: there's no physical reason (as in wave-form collapse) for it in the theory framework (unless you count just saying 'you can't know' as part of the framework)--and yet it exists anyway. I think that's an active barrier (but maybe not insurmountable) between the analysis and the practical application of the theory to anything, such as:

1. Making a game mechanic that will enforce the kind of play you're looking for, for anyone but yourself.

2. Developing a theory-based methodology for addressing mode-dysfunctions.

3. Determining things like "how much" System Does Matter (I don't expect a number--I'd suppose a grid--this type of system, this approach of player, this significant a degree)

On the other hand, at even a moderately informed 1-decision/1-mode level those things can be addressed.

Edited: and to use Mike's example--that can't really be addressed by the theory in abstract as it stands--and yet it destroyed the game. Clearly the lables apply with some degree of value-added-insight to single decisions ... I see the present take on it as walking away from the most immediate and tangible value searching for something of less value (a theory that's useful for describing a chain of play events but doesn't go much beyond that).

-Marco

[Ron Edwards]

Hello,

No, we're still talking about sets of decisions. Mike's example is not about a single decision; it's about how that decision relates to previous standards and enjoyment established earlier in play, by previous decisions which were presumably sequentially-reinforcing.

Mendel, you were looking for an uncertainty principle, which when it's at home means, which level of analysis is no longer fruitfully reductionist. I hope I've provided it for you.

Best,
Ron